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THE NEW POLITICS OF ABORTION: 
AN EQUALITY ANALYSIS OF 
WOMAN-PROTECTIVE ABORTION 
RESTRICTIONS† 
Reva B. Siegel* 
Asserting that abortions are coerced and subject women to 
physical and emotional harms, South Dakota recently passed legisla-
tion prohibiting abortion except where it would prevent the death of a 
pregnant woman.  The use of woman-protective antiabortion argu-
ment to defend the South Dakota ban reflects a shift from fetal-
focused to gender-based justifications for abortion regulation.  Al-
though the South Dakota ban was defeated by referendum, woman-
protective antiabortion argument is spreading. 
Proponents assumed the South Dakota ban would be constitu-
tional if the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade.  This lecture 
argues that even if Roe is reversed, constitutional principles of equal 
protection constrain government regulation of abortion.  The lecture 
demonstrates that woman-protective antiabortion argument of the 
kind used to justify the South Dakota ban rests on stereotypes about 
women’s capacity and family roles.  The ban was based on the under-
standing that the state should regulate women’s decisions about abor-
tion because the state knows better than women do what they really 
want and need in matters of motherhood.  This lecture argues that the 
equal protection cases that prohibit state action enforcing sex stereo-
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types prohibit laws enforcing motherhood for gender-paternalist rea-
sons of this kind. 
INTRODUCTION 
South Dakotans seized the spotlight in 2006 by enacting the most 
restrictive abortion statute in the nation.  In a direct challenge to Roe v. 
Wade,1 the state outlawed abortion, except where it would prevent the 
death of a pregnant woman.2  South Dakota’s abortion statute is constitu-
tionally significant in yet another respect.  The ban gave prominent offi-
cial endorsement to a claim that has been quietly spreading for decades: 
that abortion harms women.  Asserting that abortions are coerced and 
subject women to emotional and physical injuries, South Dakota prohib-
ited abortion to protect women, the unborn, and what the state calls “the 
mother’s fundamental natural intrinsic right to a relationship with her 
child.”3  Proponents simply assume that South Dakota’s abortion statute 
would be declared constitutional if the Court reversed Roe.4  This lecture 
challenges that premise.  The lecture demonstrates that even if Roe is 
overturned, the South Dakota statute would still be unconstitutional on 
independent grounds: prohibiting abortion for these reasons denies 
women the equal protection of the laws. 
With the abortion debate in a stalemate over the last several dec-
ades, a growing contingent of antiabortion activists have been working to 
revise their movement’s message so that it would appeal to voters con-
cerned about protecting women as well as the unborn.  To reach these 
swing voters, the antiabortion movement has borrowed core elements of 
 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006).  The 2006 South Dakota abor-
tion ban was rejected by voters in a referendum in November 2006.  Monica Davey & Libby Sander, 
South Dakotans Reject Sweeping Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P8.  Efforts continue to 
reenact the law.  See Megan Myers, Abortion Ban: Why Derailed?, ARGUS LEADER MEDIA (Sioux 
Falls, S.D.), Feb. 26, 2007, http://www.argusleader.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2007702260302 
(“Some say . . . a contentious petition drive and election campaign followed by a decisive ‘no’ vote 
from South Dakotans . . . drastically altered the legislative landscape on that issue this year.  Others 
point to significant changes in political leadership; an influx of new legislators, splinters within the 
anti-abortion community itself and a general weariness for lawmakers to go through it all again as rea-
sons for the lack of a strong force driving abortion legislation forward this year.”). 
 3. S.D. H.B. 1215; see infra notes 68–78 and accompanying text. 
 4. The state saw itself as handing a newly constituted Supreme Court an opportunity to reverse 
Roe.  State Representative Roger Hunt, who sponsored the South Dakota bill, pointed to the ap-
pointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito and anticipated the possibility of Justice Ste-
vens’s retirement “in the near future and the naming of a conservative as his successor.”  Monica 
Davey, South Dakota Bans Abortion, Setting up Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at A1.  The governor 
justified the state’s challenge to Roe on several grounds, recalling constitutional struggles over segre-
gation that led to Plessy’s overruling decades later in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954).  Davey, supra (“‘The reversal of a Supreme Court opinion is possible,’ the governor said.  ‘For 
example, in 1896, the United States Supreme Court ruled in the Plessy vs. Ferguson case that a state 
could require racial segregation in public facilities if the facilities offered to different races were equal.  
However, 58 years later, the Supreme Court reconsidered that opinion and reversed itself in Brown vs. 
Board of Education.’”). 
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the pro-choice claim, and produced a woman-protective antiabortion ar-
gument that mixes new ideas about women’s rights with some very old 
ideas about women’s roles.  Prohibiting abortion, the movement now 
emphasizes, protects women’s health and choices as mothers.  Although 
South Dakota voters rejected the ban, complaining it lacked a rape/incest 
exception, the woman-protective antiabortion argument on which the 
ban was based continues to spread.5 
South Dakota’s statute illustrates the shift from fetal-focused to 
gender-based justifications for abortion restrictions.  The legislative his-
tory gives a lengthy account of how abortion hurts women, sometimes 
explaining these harms in the language of public health, sometimes in the 
language of informed consent, and sometimes in the language of natural 
law.  This lecture analyzes the state’s claimed interest in protecting 
women from abortion and shows that these justifications rest on gender 
stereotypes about women’s capacity and women’s roles.  Enacting a law 
to compel a pregnant woman to become a mother for these reasons vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
 5. The campaign against the ban emphasized its lack of a rape/incest exception.  See infra note 
199.  The harm-to-women approach has spread throughout the antiabortion movement.  Several lead-
ing antiabortion organizations feature it as a primary argument against the availability of abortion.  
See, e.g., AM. FEMINIST, Spring 1998, available at http://www.feministsforlife.org/taf/1998/spring/ 
Spring98.pdf (issue devoted to examining the physical and psychological price women pay for abortion 
rights); Concerned Women for America, Abortion’s Physical and Emotional Risks (Jan. 18, 2003), 
http://www.cwfa.org/articles/3111/CWA/life/index.htm (“Regardless of the supposed ‘normalcy’ of 
abortion, the procedure continues to pose countless physical and emotional risks to American 
women—sometimes even costing them their lives.”); Focus on the Family, FAQ: What Can You Tell 
Me About the Possible Link Between Abortion and Breast Cancer, http://family.custhelp.com/cgi-
bin/family.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=420 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (“Recent studies re-
veal a correlation between abortion and breast cancer.”); Focus on the Family, Post-Abortion Kit, 
http://resources.family.org/product/id/102264.do (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (offering a Post-Abortion 
Kit for a suggested donation of $10.00 which “helps women identify and overcome Post-Abortion 
Syndrome—while finding healing and forgiveness”); National Right to Life Committee, Abortion: 
Some Medical Facts, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/ASMF (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (summarizing 
articles describing abortion as physically dangerous due to risks of pain, bleeding, hemorrhage, and 
infection, and psychologically damaging due to risks of developing suicidal ideations, substance abuse 
problems, and “Post-Abortion Syndrome,” among other problems); Operation Rescue, Post Abortion 
Healing, http://www.operationrescue.org/?p=80 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (“Post-Abortion Syndrome 
(PAS) is a type of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.  It occurs when a woman is unable to work through 
her emotional responses due to the trauma of an abortion.”). 
Other antiabortion organizations feature the harm-to-women argument as one among many abor-
tion-related concerns.  See, e.g., American Life League, Abortion Risks, http://www.all.org/article. 
php?id=10117 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (listing breast cancer, “post-abortion grief,” and “emotional 
and physical disturbances” as among the most common risks of abortion); Priests for Life, After Abor-
tion, http://www.priestsforlife.org/afterabortion/index.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (listing “healing” 
resources); Pro-Life Action League, Getting Help, http://www.prolifeaction.org/faq/help.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2007) (listing organizations and books for “post-abortion healing”).  The harm-to-women 
language is alive on college and university campuses as well, often through the work of the above 
groups.  For one recent account of woman-protective antiabortion argument, see Emily Bazelon, Is 
There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 41.  For an analysis of 
the rise and spread of woman-protective antiabortion argument, see infra Part II.D.  See also Reva B. 
Siegel, 2007 Brainerd Currie Memorial Lecture: The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the 
Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2007). 
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For centuries, government enforced different roles for men and 
women in the public sphere and in private life, but today we understand 
such laws to violate principles of equal citizenship.  In this lecture, I re-
view the equal protection cases that bar state action enforcing sex-
specific family roles, and consider how these cases constrain the regula-
tion of abortion.  I then show that in the past, abortion legislation re-
flected judgments about women as well as the unborn, and that under-
standings of women on which nineteenth-century abortion law rested 
violate the Constitution as we understand it today.  Finally, I show that, 
as in the nineteenth century, South Dakota’s abortion ban is concerned 
with regulating pregnant women as well as the unborn life they bear.  
The legislative history makes clear the understandings of women’s nature 
and roles upon which the abortion ban is based.  The South Dakota ban 
differs in structure from the laws struck down in many of the classic sex 
discrimination cases, but as I demonstrate, it reflects and enforces many 
of the same gender stereotypes.  An abortion ban reflecting and enforc-
ing this understanding of sex roles violates constitutional guarantees of 
equal citizenship. 
Exploring alternative constitutional limitations on the regulation of 
abortion sheds new light on the familiar constitutional framework set 
forth in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.6  
Analyzing the equal protection limitations on the regulation of abortion 
identifies a concern for liberty at the heart of constitutional protection of 
women’s equality, and a concern about sex equality at the heart of con-
stitutional protection of women’s choice. 
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 
The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state may deny per-
sons the equal protection of the laws.7  Since the early 1970s, the Court 
has enforced this guarantee with special attention to forms of state action 
that deny women equal citizenship with men.  I open with a brief review 
of how equal protection cases prohibit state action enforcing gender-
differentiated family roles, and then consider how this body of case law 
limits the regulation of abortion. 
A. Government May Not Enforce Gender-Differentiated Family Roles 
Until the 1970s federal and state law commonly discriminated be-
tween men and women in allocating benefits and burdens, and such dis-
crimination was justified as rationally reflecting differences in family 
 
 6. 505 U.S. 833, 875 (1992) (reaffirming the constitutional right to abortion and establishing an 
“undue burden” standard). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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roles.8  Government programs were premised on the supposition that 
men were wage earners who supported their families, while women con-
tributed to the family through nurturing and homemaking activities, liv-
ing as dependents of male wage earners.  In this vision, men are domi-
nant in the market and public life, while women are dominant in the 
private family sphere.  I refer to this gender-differentiated vision of fam-
ily and civil society as the separate spheres tradition. 
In a series of equal protection cases decided under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in the 1970s, the Court struck down sex-based 
laws premised on the male breadwinner/female caregiver model, reason-
ing that government cannot enforce the gender-differentiated family 
roles of the separate spheres tradition: “No longer is the female destined 
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for 
the marketplace and the world of ideas.”9  To cite but one of many such 
decisions, in Califano v. Westcott,10 the Court invalidated a Social Secu-
rity policy granting benefits to the children of unemployed fathers but 
not unemployed mothers.  Explaining why the law was unconstitutional, 
the Court observed that the regulatory scheme was “part of the baggage 
of sexual stereotypes that presumes the father has the primary responsi-
bility to provide a home and its essentials, while the mother is the center 
of home and family life.”11  Since its 1971 decision in Reed v. Reed,12 the 
Court has never sustained laws having the objective or purpose of pre-
serving or perpetuating gender-differentiated family roles. 
The Court has also emphasized that the Constitution’s prohibition 
on laws enforcing gender-differentiated family roles extends to laws that 
purport to protect women.  The case law recognizes that laws restricting 
women’s civic participation have historically been rationalized as benign 
protections for women.13  Such attempts at protecting women have since 
 
 8. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (citing Cray v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197–99 (1976)). 
 9. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975)). 
 10. 443 U.S. 76 (1979). 
 11. Id. at 89 (citations omitted). 
 12. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 13. Since Frontiero v. Richardson, the case law has recognized that the nation’s “long and unfor-
tunate history of sex discrimination” was “[t]raditionally . . . rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic 
paternalism’ [about the different family roles of men and women] which, in practical effect, put 
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”  411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).  
Justice Brennan’s opinion continues: 
Indeed, this paternalistic attitude became so firmly rooted in our national consciousness that, 100 
years ago, a distinguished Member of this Court was able to proclaim: 
“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.  The natural and proper timidity and 
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil 
life.  The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as 
well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to 
the domain and functions of womanhood.  The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and 
views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a 
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. . . . 
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of 
wife and mother.  This is the law of the Creator.” 
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been prohibited, with the Court observing, in Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan, that: 
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based 
classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed no-
tions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.  Care 
must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself 
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.  Thus, if the statutory ob-
jective is to exclude or “protect” members of one gender because 
they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be in-
nately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.14 
These cases do not hold that gender-differentiated family roles are 
wrong or harmful; rather, they assert that the Constitution prohibits gov-
ernment from imposing traditional sex roles.  Citizens may choose to ad-
here to traditional separate spheres understandings of male and female 
family roles, but law may not enforce them.  Striking down a sex-based 
alimony law in Orr v. Orr, the Court observed: 
Appellant views the Alabama alimony statutes as effectively an-
nouncing the State’s preference for an allocation of family respon-
sibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role, and as seek-
ing for their objective the reinforcement of that model among the 
State’s citizens.  We agree, as he urges, that prior cases settle that 
this purpose cannot sustain the statutes.  Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7, 10 (1975), held that the “old notio[n]” that “generally it is 
the man’s primary responsibility to provide a home and its essen-
tials,” can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis 
of gender.  “No longer is the female destined solely for the home 
and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace 
and the world of ideas.” 
. . . . 
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and bur-
dens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the 
stereotypes about the “proper place” of women and their need for 
special protection.15 
The equal protection cases prohibit the use of law to entrench fam-
ily roles rooted in separate spheres ideology, not simply because this use 
of law restricts individual opportunity but also because it enforces group 
inequality.  Government may not enforce family structures premised on 
separate spheres assumptions because these gender-differentiated under-
 
Id. at 684–85 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)).  
Justice Brennan added: 
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereo-
typed distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the posi-
tion of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre–
Civil War slave codes. 
Id. 
 14. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982). 
 15. 440 U.S. 268, 279–80, 283 (1979) (citation omitted). 
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standings of family roles have historically limited women’s civic partici-
pation.  In United States v. Virginia, the Court explained that, under in-
termediate scrutiny, government may recognize differences between the 
sexes, but only so long as in differentiating between the sexes, govern-
ment does not restrict individual opportunities or enforce group inequali-
ties: 
“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have come to 
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of 
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individ-
ual’s opportunity.  Sex classifications may be used to compensate 
women “for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” 
to “promot[e] equal employment opportunity,” to advance full de-
velopment of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.  But 
such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or 
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.16 
This long line of equal protection cases holds that it is unconstitu-
tional for the state to enact laws with the purpose of enforcing gender-
differentiated family roles.  Constitutional principles of equal citizenship 
prohibit government from enforcing its preference for family structures 
that limit women’s civic participation.  The case law treats laws that en-
force gender-differentiated family roles, regardless of whether they pur-
port to protect women, as enforcing an illegitimate form of stereotyping 
or caste resembling race discrimination. 
B. Equal Protection Constraints on the Regulation of Pregnant Women 
There has long been a question about whether and how the prohibi-
tion on sex-discriminatory state action applies to classifications concern-
ing pregnancy.  In an early case, Geduldig v. Aeillo,17 the Court held a 
disability benefits plan that excluded coverage for pregnancy did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause, reasoning that not every classification 
concerning pregnancy was sex-based like the classifications in Reed18 and 
Frontiero.  Geduldig left open the possibility that a classification concern-
ing pregnancy might be unconstitutional sex-based state action, if it can 
be shown that “distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts de-
signed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one 
 
 16. 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 17. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 18. Id. at 497 n.20 (1974).  The Court observed: 
While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow that every legislative 
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in [Reed and 
Frontiero].  Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique char-
acteristics.  Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to 
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are 
constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this 
on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition. 
Id. 
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sex or the other”19—a line of analysis I have explored in work on Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,20 which upheld the Family 
and Medical Leave Act.21  But to structure my argument on uncontro-
verted grounds, I will follow the conventional reading of Geduldig and 
treat laws regulating abortion as facially neutral for purposes of equal 
protection review. 
On this stipulated assumption, laws regulating pregnancy are un-
constitutional under Washington v. Davis22 and Personnel Administrator 
of Massachusetts v. Feeney,23 if the challenging party can show that the 
statute was adopted with a discriminatory purpose: at least in part be-
cause of and not despite its impact on women.  The unconstitutional pur-
pose need not be the sole purpose for the law’s enactment.  To demon-
strate the law’s unconstitutionality, cases like Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. teach, the plaintiff 
would have to demonstrate that an unconstitutional purpose was a “mo-
tivating factor” in the law’s enactment.24 
In this framework, laws regulating pregnant women are unconstitu-
tional if enforcing constitutionally proscribed views of women was a mo-
tivating factor in the law’s enactment.  Thus, if a law regulating pregnant 
women attempts to enforce stereotypes about women’s family roles, it 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, as the Court recently demonstrated 
in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.25 
In Hibbs, the Court held that Congress could enact the Family and 
Medical Leave Act to remedy a pattern of state action violating the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The record showed that states often awarded 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); see Reva B. Siegel, “You’ve Come 
A Long Way, Baby”: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 1871 (2006). 
 21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (1994). 
 22. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that where state action does not classify by race, the challenging 
party must demonstrate discriminatory purpose to establish an equal protection violation). 
 23. 442 U.S. 256, 272, 276 (1979) (holding that to prove discriminatory purpose, the challenging 
party must show that the challenged action was undertaken at least in part because of, and not merely 
in spite of, its impact on a protected class). 
 24. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).  The 
Court observed: 
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on ra-
cially discriminatory purposes.  Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body op-
erating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that 
a particular purpose was the “dominant” or “primary” one.  In fact, it is because legislators and 
administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that 
courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or ir-
rationality.  But racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration.  When there is 
a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial 
deference is no longer justified. 
Id.; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (discussing framework for proving 
mixed motive in a Title VII sex discrimination case); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 25. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1873. 
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parenting leave to women and not men.26  In addition, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reported: 
Many States offered women extended “maternity” leave that ex-
ceeded the typical 4- to 8- week period of physical disability due to 
pregnancy and childbirth, but very few States granted men a paral-
lel benefit. . . . This and other differential leave policies were not at-
tributable to any differential physical needs of men and women, but 
rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family 
members is women’s work.27 
Hibbs recognizes that state regulation concerning pregnancy can re-
flect and enforce unconstitutional sex-role assumptions about women’s 
role as mothers.28 
II. SEX-ROLE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE REGULATION OF ABORTION 
I take as a given that abortion statutes are enacted by persons inter-
ested in protecting unborn life.  I also proceed from a less widely shared 
premise: that arguments for imposing legal restrictions on abortion inevi-
tably rest on judgments about women and the unborn.  For purposes of 
this lecture, I restrict myself to a narrower argument: that arguments for 
criminalizing abortion can reflect judgments about women as well as the 
unborn, and these judgments about women may be of a kind that the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits government to enforce by law.  If 
separate spheres views of women’s roles played a motivating part in the 
enactment of abortion restrictions, the abortion restrictions violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
In this portion of the lecture, I will demonstrate that sex-role as-
sumptions about women can motivate the enactment of statutes prohibit-
ing abortion, and that such unconstitutional assumptions played a signifi-
cant part in the enactment of South Dakota’s abortion ban.  I develop 
this claim in three stages.  First, I will show—and have elsewhere exten-
sively argued—that the statutes that first criminalized abortion and con-
traception in the nineteenth century were based on separate spheres un-
derstandings of women that today we would plainly view as 
unconstitutional.29  Second, I will demonstrate that the understandings on 
which nineteenth-century criminal abortion statutes rested are not simply 
beliefs of the past.  Even though these beliefs were energetically con-
tested during the twentieth century and at least in part disestablished by 
equal protection law, many in the “traditional family values” movement 
are now seeking to give these beliefs new life through law—including the 
enactment of criminal abortion laws.  To illustrate this, I discuss a recent 
 
 26. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730–31 (2003). 
 27. Id. at 731; see also id. at 731 n.5. 
 28. See id. at 736. 
 29. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
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statement of the movement’s aims and principles.  Third, I demonstrate 
that the South Dakota statute reflects and enforces stereotypical views of 
women’s roles.  In recent years the antiabortion movement has been ar-
guing that restrictions on abortion are needed to protect women as well 
as the unborn life they bear.  South Dakota’s statute reflects this shift 
from fetal-focused to gender-based justifications for abortion restrictions.  
I examine the woman-protective justifications that South Dakota offers 
for prohibiting abortion as these justifications have been expressed in the 
legislative history of the statute and by leaders of the national antiabor-
tion movement.  In Part III of the lecture, I show why an antiabortion 
statute enacted for these reasons violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
A. Separate Spheres Reasoning in the Nineteenth-Century 
Campaign to Criminalize Abortion 
At common law, the practice of contraception was wholly unregu-
lated and abortion was legal until quickening, a pregnant woman’s first 
perception of fetal movement.30  This regulatory framework changed in 
the mid-nineteenth century, when doctors of the newly formed American 
Medical Association (AMA) advocated legislation that would criminal-
ize contraception and abortion.  Doctors invoked a set of interlocking ar-
guments about human reproduction to justify these new legal controls on 
contraception and abortion, offering scientific arguments about women 
and the unborn life they might bear.  Horatio Storer, the leader of the 
criminalization campaign, invoked the authority of medical science to ar-
gue that life begins at conception: “The first impregnation of the egg, 
whether in man or in kangaroo, is the birth of the offspring to life; its 
emergence into the outside world for a wholly separate existence is, for 
one as for the other, but an accident in time.”31  He also invoked the au-
thority of medical science when he asserted that a woman had a duty to 
procreate that was dictated by her anatomy: 
Were woman intended as a mere plaything, or for the gratification 
of her own or her husband’s desires, there would have been need 
for her of neither uterus nor ovaries, nor would the prevention of 
their being used for their clearly legitimate purpose have been at-
tended by such tremendous penalties as is in reality the case.32 
In opposing contraception and abortion, the medical profession 
acted from beliefs about women as well as the future generations they 
 
 30. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *129–30; JANE FARELL BRODIE, 
CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997); LINDA GORDON, THE 
MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA (2002); JAMES 
C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–1900 
(1978); ANDREA TONE, DEVICES AND DESIRES: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTIVES IN AMERICA 
(2001). 
 31. HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 31 (1866). 
 32. Id. at 80–81. 
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might bear.  Physicians who advocated criminalizing abortion and con-
traception argued that a woman who shirked her duty to bear children 
committed “physiological sin.”33  The only way that a wife could ensure 
her health was to bear children, pregnancy being “a normal physiological 
condition, and often absolutely necessary to the physical and moral 
health of woman.”34  There are volumes of this material.  As Horatio 
Storer explained: 
Is there then no alternative but for women, when married and 
prone to conception, to occasionally bear children?  This, as we 
have seen is the end for which they are physiologically constituted 
and for which they are destined by nature. . . . [The prevention and 
termination of pregnancy] are alike disastrous to a woman’s mental, 
moral, and physical wellbeing.35 
Thus, physicians arguing for the criminalization of abortion rea-
soned that life begins at conception, but their judgments about abortion 
were equally and explicitly premised on the view that a woman’s anat-
omy was her destiny, that a woman’s highest and best use was in bearing 
children.  The doctors viewed a woman’s reasons for seeking an abortion 
as egoistic derogations of maternal duty.  Dr. Augustus Gardner ex-
pressed the views of many when he objected: “Is it not arrant laziness, 
sheer, craven, culpable cowardice, which is at the bottom of this base 
act? . . . Have you the right to choose an indolent, selfish life, neglecting 
the work God has appointed you to perform?”36  The AMA’s 1871 Re-
port on Criminal Abortion further denounced the woman who aborted a 
pregnancy: “She becomes unmindful of the course marked out for her by 
Providence, she overlooks the duties imposed on her by the marriage 
contract.  She yields to the pleasures—but shrinks from the pains and re-
sponsibilities of maternity.”37  Thus, the same doctors who invoked medi-
cal science to condemn abortion as “foeticide” also condemned the prac-
tice as violating women’s roles: 
Woman’s rights and woman’s sphere are, as understood by the 
American public, quite different from that understood by us as Phy-
sicians, or as Anatomists, or Physiologists. 
“Woman’s rights” now are understood to be, that she should 
be a man, and that her physical organism, which is constituted by 
 
 33. HIRAM S. POMEROY, THE ETHICS OF MARRIAGE 97 (1888). 
 34. EDWIN M. HALE, THE GREAT CRIME OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 6 n. (C. S. Halsey ed., 
1867). 
 35. STORER, supra note 31, at 74–76; see also HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, IS IT I? A BOOK FOR 
EVERY MAN 115–16 (1868) (“Every married woman, save in very exceptional cases, which should only 
be allowed to be such by the decision of a competent physician, every married woman, until the so-
called turn in life, should occasionally bear a child; not as a duty to the community merely . . . but as 
the best means of insuring her own permanent good health.”). 
 36. Augustus K. Gardner, Physical Decline of American Women, in AUGUSTUS K. GARDNER, 
CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE LAWS OF LIFE AND HEALTH 225 (J. S. Redfield ed., 1870). 
 37. D. A. O’Donnell & W. L. Atlee, Report on Criminal Abortion, 22 TRANSACTIONS AM. MED. 
ASS’N 239, 241 (1871). 
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Nature to bear and rear offspring, should be left in abeyance, and 
that her ministrations in the formation of character as mother 
should be abandoned for the sterner rights of voting and law mak-
ing. 
The whole country is in an abnormal state, and the tendency 
to force women into men’s places, creates new ideas of women’s du-
ties, and therefore . . . the marriage state is frequently child-
less. . . . These influences act and react on public sentiment, until 
the public conscience becomes blunted, and duties necessary to 
women’s physical organization are shirked, neglected, or criminally 
prevented.38 
To summarize, in the nineteenth century, the medical profession ar-
gued for the criminalization of abortion on the grounds that human life 
deserves protection from the moment of conception, buttressing this ar-
gument with claims from reproductive physiology.  With equal fervor, 
these same doctors argued for the criminalization of abortion to ensure 
that women performed their proper roles as wives and mothers, also but-
tressing this argument with claims from reproductive physiology.  In 
short, nineteenth-century criminal restrictions on abortion were enacted 
as caste legislation, for the purpose of enforcing gender-specific family 
roles.  For several decades now the Court has interpreted the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to prohibit government from enforcing gender-
differentiated family roles.  Yet this vision of the family, and of govern-
ment’s role in protecting it, is still attractive to many. 
B. The Traditional Family Values Movement 
Today, few who seek to ban abortion would oppose women voting 
as did the physicians who led the nineteenth-century criminalization 
campaign.39  But a number of prominent conservative groups have ex-
pressed opposition to abortion in a statement that calls for government 
to reinforce traditional, gender-differentiated marriage and family roles. 
In March of 2005, leaders of a group of organizations that oppose 
abortion gathered at the National Press Club to endorse a new statement 
of family values.40  The statement, written by Alan Carlson and Paul 
Mero of the Howard Center, an affiliate of the World Congress of Fami-
lies, was called The Natural Family: A Manifesto.41  The Manifesto gives 
 
 38. Siegel, supra note 29, at 303–04 (quoting Montrose A. Pallen, Foeticide, or Criminal Abor-
tion, 3 MED. ARCHIVES 193, 205–06 (1869) (paper read before the Missouri State Medical Association 
in April 1868)). 
 39. MOHR, supra note 30, at 168. 
 40. See Susan Jones, Conservative Leaders Issue ‘Family Manifesto,’ CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, 
Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCulture.asp?Page=%5CCulture%5Carchive%5C200503 
%5CCUL20050315a.html. 
 41. Allan C. Carlson & Paul T. Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto, FAM. AM. (SPECIAL 
EDITION) 1, Mar. 2005, available at http://www.heartland.org/pdf/17267.pdf.  For a list of other affiliate 
organizations of the World Congress of Families, see World Congress of Families IV: Warsaw 2007: 
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principled expression to a vision of sexuality and family roles that under-
girds the group’s opposition to abortion, extramarital sex, and same-sex 
marriage.42 
The Manifesto opposes abortion in the course of opposing sex out-
side marriage.  Its statement of principles reads: “We affirm the marital 
union to be the authentic sexual bond, the only one open to the natural 
and responsible creation of new life.”43  The Manifesto then affirms the 
group’s belief in the “sanctity of human life from conception to natural 
death; each newly conceived person holds rights to live, to grow, to be 
born, and to share a home with its natural parents bound by marriage.”44  
After asserting that each life conceived not only has a right to life, but 
more particularly, a right to be raised by its natural parents in marriage, 
the Manifesto then calls upon “[c]ulture, law, and policy” to regulate the 
sexes on the understanding that everything men and women do is gov-
erned by their different roles in parenting children: 
We affirm that women and men are equal in dignity and innate hu-
man rights, but different in function.  Even if sometimes thwarted 
by events beyond the individual’s control (or sometimes given up 
for a religious vocation), the calling of each boy is to become hus-
band and father; the calling of each girl is to become wife and 
mother.  Everything that a man does is mediated by his aptness for 
fatherhood.  Everything a woman does is mediated by her aptness for 
motherhood.  Culture, law, and policy should take these differences 
into account.45 
The Manifesto also affirms belief in women’s rights, but defines 
women’s rights as a bundle of gender-specific rights that women have by 
virtue of their role as mothers: 
We believe wholeheartedly in women’s rights. 
Above all, we believe in rights that recognize women’s unique 
gifts of pregnancy, birthing, and breastfeeding.  The goal of androg-
yny, the effort to eliminate real difference between women and 
men, does every bit as much violence to human nature and human 
rights as the old efforts by the communists to create “Soviet Man” 
and by the nazis [sic] to create “Aryan Man.”46 
 
The Howard Center, http://www.worldcongress.org/WCF4/wcf4.ini.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).  I 
first encountered the Manifesto in reading Linda McClain’s work on the role of the family in debates 
over human rights instruments, and I am grateful to her for inviting engagement with this document. 
 42. See Carlson & Mero, supra note 41, at 18 (“We will build legal and constitutional protections 
around marriage as the union of a man and a woman.”); id. at 20 (“We will end the culture of abortion 
and the mass slaughter of the innocents.”). 
 43. Id. at 15. 
 44. Id. at 16. 
 45. Id. (emphasis added).  The Manifesto celebrates gender-differentiation and role-
complementarity as the core of the marriage relationship: “We affirm that complementarity of the 
sexes is a source of strength.  Men and women exhibit profound biological and psychological differ-
ences.  When united in marriage, though, the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts.”  Id. at 
17. 
 46. Id. at 25. 
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The Manifesto presents the gender-differentiated family as a fact of 
nature to which law must conform.  The Manifesto asserts that “the natu-
ral family is a fixed aspect of the created order, one ingrained in human 
nature,” and claims that “the natural family cannot change into some 
new shape; nor can it be re-defined by eager social engineers. . . . [A]ll 
other ‘family forms’ are incomplete or are fabrications of the state.”47  It 
affirms that “the natural family, not the individual, is the fundamental 
unit of society”48 and asserts “that the natural family is prior to the state 
and that legitimate governments exist to shelter and encourage the natu-
ral family.”49  Yet, paradoxically, the “natural” family depends upon law 
and the state for its realization: Without laws to support it, the “natural” 
family is at risk of dissolution.  The Manifesto looks “with affection” and 
“delight” “to earlier familial eras such as ‘1950’s America,’” and en-
dorses policies that “aspire to recreate such results.”50 
To realize this ideal, the Manifesto calls for policies that discourage 
sex outside of marriage and that condemn contraception and abortion, to 
encourage an increase of childbearing in marriage.  “We will end the war 
of the sexual hedonists on marriage. . . . We will empower the legal and 
cultural guardians of marriage and public morality.  We will end the 
coarsening of our culture.”51  “To welcome more babies within mar-
riage. . . . We will end state programs that indoctrinate children, youth, 
and adults into the contraceptive mentality.  We will restore respect for 
life.  We will end the culture of abortion and the mass slaughter of inno-
cents.”52  The Manifesto endorses policies that encourage childrearing by 
parents who stay at home.53 
Although it affirms the value of each parent spending time with 
children, the Manifesto encourages the regulation of work and family re-
lations so as to reward parents for playing gender-differentiated roles in 
raising a family.  The Manifesto affirms women’s right to participate in 
education and employment, but does not affirm their right to participate 
on equal terms with men: 
We reject social engineering, attempts to corrupt girls and boys, to 
confuse women and men about their true identities.  At the same 
time, nothing in our platform would prevent women from seeking 
and attaining as much education as they want.  Nothing in our plat-
form would prevent women from entering jobs and professions to 
which they aspire.  We do object, however, to restrictions on the 
liberty of employers to recognize family relations and obligations 
 
 47. Id. at 15. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 16. 
 50. Id. at 24. 
 51. Id. at 19. 
 52. Id. at 19–20 (emphasis omitted). 
 53. Id. at 21 (“To bring mothers, and fathers, home. . . We will ensure that stay-at-home parents 
enjoy at least the same state benefits offered to day-care users.  We will end all discriminations against 
stay-at-home parents.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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and so reward indirectly those parents staying at home to care for 
their children.54 
Rather than endorse the principle of equal pay for equal work, the Mani-
festo announces: “We affirm the ‘family wage’ ideal of ‘equal pay for 
equal family responsibility.’  Compensation for work and taxation should 
reinforce natural family bonds.”55  Accordingly, the Manifesto opposes 
laws that require the equal treatment of men and women in employment 
and compensation: 
To create a true home economy. . . 
• We will allow men and women to live in harmony with their 
true natures.  We will end the aggressive state promotion of 
androgyny. 
• We will encourage employers to pay a “family wage” to 
heads of households.  We will end laws that prohibit employ-
ers from recognizing and rewarding family responsibility.56 
And so the Manifesto calls for government to reestablish the “family 
wage,” the practice of paying higher wages to “heads of households” in 
order to “reward indirectly those parents staying at home to care for 
their children”—a practice prohibited by federal employment discrimina-
tion law for almost a half century now.57 
These are not the views of a marginal few.  They have been en-
dorsed by prominent national leaders of the traditional family values 
movement.58  The Natural Family Manifesto has been endorsed by Jerry 
Falwell,59 Paul Weyrich,60 Phyllis Schlafly,61 Gary Bauer,62 and represen-
 
 54. Id. at 25–26. 
 55. Id. at 17. 
 56. Id. at 21–22 (emphasis omitted). 
 57. Federal law bars the longstanding practice of paying men more than women because they are 
heads of household, and for this reason, closely scrutinizes compensation schemes that claim simply to 
reward heads of household.  See Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.11(c) 
(2007) (“Where an employer conditions benefits available to employees and their spouses and families 
on whether the employee is the ‘head of the household’ or ‘principal wage earner’ in the family unit, 
the overall implementation of the plan will be closely scrutinized.”). 
 58. See Paul Weyrich, Traditional Family Values, AM. DAILY, May 4, 2005, http://www. 
americandaily.com/article/7675. 
 59. The Natural Family: A Manifesto, Featured Endorsements, http://www.familymanifesto.net/ 
fm/endorsements.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Manifesto Endorsements].  Conservative 
Christian activist Jerry Falwell led the Moral Majority from 1979 to 1989.  The Moral Majority Coali-
tion, The Moral Majority Timeline, http://www.moralmajority.us/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=5&Itemid=29 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 60. Manifesto Endorsements, supra note 59.  Paul Weyrich founded the Heritage Foundation, an 
influential conservative think tank, and helped Falwell create the Moral Majority.  William Martin, 
WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE: THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IN AMERICA 171–72 (2000).  For a de-
tailed résumé of his New Right activities, see Free Congress Foundation, http://www.freecongress.org 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 61. Manifesto Endorsements, supra note 59.  Phyllis Schlafly led the campaign against the Equal 
Rights Amendment in the 1970s, DONALD CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS 
CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN’S CRUSADE 212–69 (2005), and is the founding president of the Eagle Fo-
rum, a multi-issue women’s organization that aims to “expose[] radical feminists.”  Join Eagle Forum 
and Phyllis Schlafly, http://www.eagleforum.org/misc/descript.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
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tatives of Southern Baptist Theological Seminary,63 Concerned Women 
for America,64 the Heritage Foundation,65 Priests for Life,66 and Alliance 
for the Family.67 
C. South Dakota’s Abortion Ban 
In prohibiting abortion, the South Dakota Legislature expressed 
and enforced understandings of women’s family role much like those ex-
pressed in the nineteenth-century criminalization campaign, and more 
recently in the World Congress of Families’ Natural Family Manifesto.  
The South Dakota statute regulated women, not simply as an incident of 
the state’s interest in protecting unborn life, but as an end in itself.  The 
 
 62. Manifesto Endorsements, supra note 59.  Gary Bauer served as Chief Domestic Policy advi-
sor to Ronald Reagan from 1986 to 1988, headed the Family Research Council from 1988 to 1999, and 
ran for President in 2000.  His current projects include involvement in the American Values PAC, the 
Campaign for Working Families PAC, and Americans United to Preserve Marriage.  SARA DIAMOND, 
NOT BY POLITICS ALONE: THE ENDURING INFLUENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 236–37 (1998); 
American Values—Your Voice to Help Protect Life, Marriage, Faith, and Family, http://www. 
ouramericanvalues.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2007); Campaign for Working Families—
Unapologetically Pro-Family, Pro-Life, and Pro-Growth, http://www.cwfpac.com (last visited Mar. 21, 
2007); FRC Action, http://www.frcaction.org/index.cfm?i=WX06C16#AUPM (last visited Mar. 21, 
2007); People for the American Way—Family Research Council, http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/ 
default.aspx?oid=4211 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 63. Manifesto Endorsements, supra note 59.  R. Albert Mohler, Jr., Ph.D., is president of the 
Southern Theological Seminary and a leader in the Southern Baptist Convention.  He served on the 
2000 committee that revised the Southern Baptist statement of faith to enjoin women’s submission to 
men in marriage.  SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, THE BAPTIST FAITH AND MESSAGE (2000), 
available at http://www.sbc.net/bfm/pdf/The%20Baptist%20Faith%20and%20Message.pdf (“A wife is 
to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband even as the church willingly sub-
mits to the headship of Christ.”); Albert Mohler’s Bio, http://www.albertmohler.com/bio.php (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 64. Manifesto Endorsements, supra note 59.  Janice Crouse is Senior Fellow at the Beverly La-
Haye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, which LaHaye founded in 1979 to 
mobilize Christian women against the Equal Rights Amendment.  Crouse served as a speechwriter for 
George H. W. Bush and was one of George W. Bush’s delegates to the 2003 United Nations Commis-
sion on Women.  Concerned Women for America—About CWA, http://www.cwfa.org/history.asp 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2007); Concerned Women for America—Janice Crouse, Ph.D. (Oct. 10, 2002), 
http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=2112; see also DIAMOND, supra note 62, at 82. 
 65. Manifesto Endorsements, supra note 59.  Patrick Fagan, the William H. G. FitzGerald Re-
search Fellow in Family and Cultural Issues at the Heritage Foundation, was Deputy Assistant of 
Health and Human Services during the first Bush Administration and a Legislative Analyst to Senator 
Dan Coats (R-Ind.).  The Heritage Foundation, Patrick F. Fagan, http://www.heritage.org/About/ 
Staff/PatrickFagan.cfm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 66. Manifesto Endorsements, supra note 59.  Dr. Paul Schenck is a Pastoral Associate at Priests 
for Life, which was founded in 1991 and is supported by Catholic leaders in the United States and the 
Vatican.  Schenck also spent three years as Executive Vice President at the American Center for Law 
and Justice, which Pat Robertson created in 1990 to litigate on behalf of “religious liberties.”  Ameri-
can Center for Law & Justice, History of ACLJ, http://www.aclj.org/About/default.aspx?Section=10 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2007); Bio Sketch of Paul Schenck, http://priestsforlife.org/staff/schenck.htm (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2007); What is the Purpose of Priests for Life?, http://www.priestsforlife.org/intro/ 
purpose.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 67. Audio file: Statement of Cristina Vollmer de Burelli Endorsing the Natural Family Manifesto 
on Behalf of Alliance for the Family (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www.familymanifesto.net/ 
fmMedia/fm.vollmer.mp3 (“Alliance for the Family fully supports the Natural Family Manifesto, and 
shares its vision, principles, and definition of the natural family . . . .”). 
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abortion ban reflected and enforced beliefs about women and the family, 
as well as the unborn. 
The state entitled the abortion ban the “South Dakota Women’s 
Health and Human Life Protection Act.”68  By its title, the ban an-
nounced a concern with the regulation of women as well as the unborn 
life they might bear.  The legislation made this purpose explicit, declaring 
that “to fully protect the rights, interests, and health of the pregnant 
mother, the rights, interest, and life of her unborn child, and the mother’s 
fundamental natural intrinsic right to a relationship with her child, abor-
tions in South Dakota should be prohibited.”69  The statute made it a fel-
ony to provide drugs or procedures to a pregnant woman that terminate 
the “life of an unborn human being,”70 excluding only those medical pro-
cedures performed by a licensed physician intended to prevent the death 
of a pregnant woman.71  But even as the law imposed criminal sanctions 
on those who assist a pregnant woman in obtaining an abortion, it ex-
empted the pregnant woman herself from criminal liability for seeking an 
abortion, providing that “[n]othing in this Act may be construed to sub-
ject the pregnant mother upon whom any abortion is performed or at-
tempted to any criminal conviction and penalty.”72 
The South Dakota Legislature based the statute on the findings of a 
task force on abortion that it had appointed the year before the law was 
enacted.73  The law explicitly incorporated the findings of the seventy-
one-page Report of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, 
which was submitted to the Governor and Legislature of South Dakota 
in December 2005.74 
 
 68. H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006). 
 69. Id. 
 70. House Bill 1215 reads: 
No person may knowingly administer to, prescribe for, or procure for, or sell to any preg-
nant woman any medicine, drug, or other substance with the specific intent of causing or abetting 
the termination of the life of an unborn human being.  No person may knowingly use or employ 
any instrument or procedure upon a pregnant woman with the specific intent of causing or abet-
ting the termination of the life of an unborn human being. 
Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. The formation of the task force is outlined in part in South Dakota House Bill 1233.  H.B. 
1233, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005) (appointing task force of fifteen members, appointed by the 
Legislature and the governor and providing that the “task force shall be under the supervision of the 
Executive Board of the Legislative Research Council and staffed and funded as an interim legislative 
committee”). 
 74. South Dakota House Bill 1215 incorporates the report into the statute: 
The Legislature accepts and concurs with the conclusion of the South Dakota Task Force to 
Study Abortion, based upon written materials, scientific studies, and testimony of witnesses pre-
sented to the task force, that life begins at the time of conception, a conclusion confirmed by sci-
entific advances since the 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade, including the fact that each human being 
is totally unique immediately at fertilization.  Moreover, the Legislature finds, based upon the 
conclusions of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, and in recognition of the techno-
logical advances and medical experience and body of knowledge about abortions produced and 
made available since the 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade, that to fully protect the rights, interests, 
and health of the pregnant mother, the rights, interest, and life of her unborn child, and the 
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As one would expect, the legislative history of the ban discusses the 
physiology of human reproduction, and asserts “that as a matter of scien-
tific fact an abortion terminates the life of a whole separate unique living 
human being.”75 
The task force finds that the new recombinant DNA technologies 
indisputably prove that the unborn child is a whole human being 
from the moment of fertilization, that all abortions terminate the 
life of a living human being, and that the unborn child is a separate 
human patient under the care of modern medicine.76 
Substantial portions of the report are devoted to analyzing prenatal de-
velopment and to explaining the importance of prohibiting abortion in 
order to protect the unborn.77 
But the South Dakota Task Force Report is not simply, or even pri-
marily, concerned with discussing the unborn.  Over half of the Report is 
devoted to explaining the state’s interest in prohibiting abortion to pro-
tect women.78  The Task Force Report explains that women need protec-
 
mother’s fundamental natural intrinsic right to a relationship with her child, abortions in South 
Dakota should be prohibited.  Moreover, the Legislature finds that the guarantee of due process 
of law under the Constitution of South Dakota applies equally to born and unborn human beings, 
and that under the Constitution of South Dakota, a pregnant mother and her unborn child, each 
possess a natural and inalienable right to life. 
S.D. H.B. 1215. 
 75. REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 5 (2005), http://www. 
dakotavoice.com/Docs/South%20Dakota%20Abortion%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf [hereinaf-
ter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 76. Id. at 31. 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 12–14, 22–30, 56–64. 
 78. Approximately forty of the Task Force Report’s seventy-one pages cover this issue. 
In 2005, the Legislature commissioned the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, S.D. H.B. 
1233, and enacted a companion bill amending South Dakota’s Abortion Informed Consent Statute, 
H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005).  South Dakota House Bill 1166 expressed the legislative 
finding, codified in section 34-23A-1.5 of the South Dakota Code, 
that pregnant women contemplating their termination of the right to their relationship with their 
unborn children, including women contemplating such termination by an abortion procedure, are 
faced with making a profound decision most often under stress and pressures from circumstances 
and from other persons, . . . and that the State of South Dakota has a compelling interest in pro-
viding such protection. 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 5. 
When the abortion ban statute recommended by the Task Force was introduced in the South Da-
kota Legislature in 2006, much of the testimony focused on how abortion harms women.  See, e.g., 
Audio file: Testimony of Rep. Roger W. Hunt before S.D. House State Affairs Committee on H.B. 
1215 (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2006/1215.htm (click on the audio file 
icon for 02/08/2006) (“We know more about post-abortion physical and mental problems than was 
even conceived, if you would, at the time of the decision of Roe v. Wade. . . . Roe v. Wade was prem-
ised, I think we all need to remember, on what abortion did for women, but it did not address what 
abortion does to women. . . . We’re talking of protecting the health of the mother.”); see also Audio 
file: Testimony of Postabortion Counselor Nicole Osmundsen before S.D. House State Affairs Com-
mittee on H.B. 1215 (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2006/1215.htm (“The 
majority of the women that I counsel say that they are coerced into their decision. . . . [They later suf-
fer from] depression, uncontrollable crying, bonding issues with subsequent children, regrets, to drug 
and alcohol abuse, to eating disorders, to divorce . . . to suicide attempts and very very destructive be-
haviors, as in even denying themself the opportunity to have further children . . . . The most significant 
example I can give you was the woman that I counseled who could no longer vacuum her house be-
cause she can’t hear the sound of a vacuum; it reminds her of the suction machine of her abortion pro-
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tion from abortion because women are misled into having abortions, co-
erced into having abortions, and are being harmed by abortions.  In what 
follows I discuss each of South Dakota’s woman-protective rationales for 
the abortion ban, and demonstrate its basis in the arguments of the na-
tional antiabortion movement.  I then show how the argument for crimi-
nalizing abortion to protect women rests on gender-stereotypes about 
women.  South Dakota has openly acknowledged that it is interested in 
prohibiting abortion, not simply because it is interested in protecting the 
unborn, but because it is interested in regulating women’s conduct as 
mothers. 
1. Women-Protective Justifications for South Dakota’s Abortion Ban: 
Preventing Misrepresentation, Coercion, and Societal Pressure 
The South Dakota Task Force asserted that women in the state 
have not actually chosen to have abortions.  Rather, the Task Force 
maintained that women are misled or coerced into having abortions.  The 
Task Force received the testimony of 1950 women,79 and reported that 
“[v]irtually all of them stated they thought their abortions were unin-
formed or coerced or both.”80 
The Task Force Report accuses abortion clinics of affirmatively mis-
representing the abortion procedure, by telling pregnant women that 
they were carrying nothing but some “tissue.”81  The Task Force Report 
also accuses the clinics of misrepresenting the abortion procedure by 
omission, by failing to explain to the pregnant woman that the procedure 
would terminate the life of a “living human being.”82  Sometimes, the 
Task Force Report argues that even where women having abortions knew 
the facts of reproductive physiology, their decisions were uninformed be-
cause the women lacked the professional expertise sufficient to evaluate 
the information: 
The testimony of the nearly two thousand women who had abor-
tions is replete with references to how they were left to fend for 
themselves and allowed to make decisions based upon false as-
sumptions of biological fact.  The abortion providers wanted the 
 
cedure. . . . Do they ever fully recover?  I would fair to say no [sic].”).  For antecedents of this trauma 
claim, see Siegel, supra note 5 (tracing testimony about vacuum symptoms back to the 1980s). 
 79. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 38. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 21 (“Women were not told the truth about abortion, were misled into thinking that 
nothing but ‘tissue’ was being removed, and relate that they would not have had an abortion if they 
were told the truth.”). 
 82. Id. at 38; see also id. at 16–17 (“It is impossible for a woman to give informed consent to an 
abortion if she does not fully understand that her child is in existence and that she is consenting to the 
termination of the life of her child. . . . We find that the withholding of the biological information from 
women has the effect of imposing the personal philosophy of Planned Parenthood and its agents upon 
these women. . . . This precludes the mother from making the decision for herself about whether the 
life of the human being in question has value.”). 
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women to make decisions about those biological facts themselves 
even though they had no expertise.83 
At other junctures, the Task Force Report suggests that no matter 
what a clinic tells a client or however great her expertise, the abortion 
procedure inherently lacks consent because a pregnant woman cannot 
make a truly informed decision to give up a relationship with a child until 
after the child is born.84  The Task Force Report suggests that women 
making a decision to abort a pregnancy cannot knowingly consent to the 
procedure unless they are in the position of women making a decision to 
give a child up for adoption, and have the opportunity to reconsider their 
decision after the child’s birth. 
The Task Force Report does not limit itself to the claim that women 
are misled into having abortions that they would not choose to have if 
they were better informed of the facts.  It recounts testimony of women 
who “were coerced into having the abortion by the father of the child or 
a parent.”85  Sometimes the Report speaks of coercion; as often it objects 
that women are subject to “pressure” in deciding whether to abort a 
pregnancy; and at points it frankly acknowledges that its objections 
about coercion reflect concern about the pressures to which a woman 
making an abortion decision is subject.  “[Abortion] has created a unique 
and especially painful exploitation of women.  It has subjected women to 
the unjust and selfish demands of male sexual partners.”86  “[T]he abor-
tion clinics also apply pressure to have the abortion.”87  “The Task Force 
finds that women are often subjected to coercion in the form of overt and 
subtle pressures from outside sources and from the abortion procedure 
itself that render their decision involuntary.”88  “[T]here are many pres-
sures and coercive forces and elements, including some that are hidden 
and inherent in the nature of the procedure, that render most abortions 
not truly voluntary.”89 
In the end, the Report’s argument that women have not truly chosen 
abortion because they were misled, coerced, or pressured in their abor-
 
 83. Id. at 39. 
 84. Cf. id. at 56 (“Even when the pregnant mother has the entire nine months of pregnancy to 
investigate her options and reach a reasoned decision about whether to parent her child, the law does 
not entrust the termination of the mother’s rights to an adoption agency.  Only a court of law, after a 
hearing, can terminate the mother’s rights.”); id. at 40 n.16 (“[W]ith adoptions, the mother does not 
make a decision until after birth when she has had an opportunity to see and hold her child and the 
reality of what she is giving up is concrete.”). 
 85. Id. at 21. 
 86. Id. at 31–32. 
 87. Id. at 21.  The Task Force continues, “[Women who have had abortions] almost uniformly 
express anger toward the abortion providers, their baby’s father, or society in general, which promote 
abortion as a great right, the exercise of which is good for women.”  Id.; see also id. at 39–40 (“The 
process that takes place immediately before the abortion procedure also creates a coercive environ-
ment.  The record reflects that women are pressured into making the decision quickly. . . . without 
time to reflect.”). 
 88. Id. at 40. 
 89. Id. at 37. 
SIEGEL.DOC 4/12/2007  5:03:49 PM 
No. 3] WOMAN-PROTECTIVE ABORTION RESTRICTIONS 1011 
tion decision converges with a distinct argument on which the informed 
consent argument may rest: that women should not have chosen abortion 
because abortion harms women. 
2. Women-Protective Justifications for South Dakota’s Abortion Ban: 
Preventing Harm to Women’s Health 
The Task Force Report argues that “the abortion procedure is in-
herently dangerous to the psychological and physical health of the preg-
nant mother.”90  Lengthy sections of the Report discuss the psychological 
and physical harm that abortion allegedly inflicts on women. 
Psychological harm.  The Task Force Report rejects, as ideologically 
biased, the finding of the American Psychological Association (APA) 
that abortion has “no lasting or significant health risks.”91  Citing studies 
that controvert the findings of major scientific and government authori-
ties, the Task Force argues that abortion inflicts grave psychological inju-
ries on women.92  The Task Force Report asserts that a cascade of mental 
health disorders attend abortion, including bipolar disorder, depressive 
psychosis, neurotic depression, schizophrenia, guilt, anger, post-
 
 90. Id. at 66. 
 91. Id. at 46 (“[M]ajor medical and mental health professional organizations support [an expert 
witness’s] belief that post-abortion depression is without foundation in scientific studies.  Her belief is 
that if the American Psychological Association (APA), for example, concludes that abortion has no 
lasting or significant health risks, that this determination is made by an objective scientific organiza-
tion of psychologists.”); see id. at 47 (stating that the Task Force “fails to concur with” the conclusions 
of the expert witness). 
 92. See id. at 41–47 (citing studies finding psychological harm attends abortion); cf. ELLIE LEE, 
ABORTION, MOTHERHOOD, AND MENTAL HEALTH: MEDICALIZING REPRODUCTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 120 (2003) (discussing government and professional organizations that 
refute claims of a “postabortion syndrome”).  For authorities that repudiate postabortion syndrome or 
various of the claims associated with it, see N. E. Adler et al., Psychological Responses After Abortion, 
248 SCI. 41, 43 (1990) (“The time of greatest distress is likely to be before the abortion.  Severe nega-
tive reactions after abortions are rare and can best be understood in the framework of coping with a 
normal life stress.”); Anne C. Gilchrist et al., Termination of Pregnancy and Psychiatric Morbidity, 
167(2) BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 243, 243–48 (1995) (“No overall increase in reported psychiatric morbid-
ity was found.”); Brenda Major et al., Personal Resilience, Cognitive Appraisals, and Coping: An Inte-
grative Model of Adjustment to Abortion, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735, 741 (1998) 
(“Overall, our sample of women did not report high levels of psychological distress 1 month following 
their abortions . . . . On average women also reported relatively high levels of positive well-being (M = 
4.60 on a 6-point scale, SD =.69) and very high satisfaction with their abortion decision (M = 4.05 on a 
5-point scale, SD = .94).”); Nancy F. Russo & Jean E. Denious, Controlling Birth: Science, Politics, and 
Public Policy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 181, 185 (2005) (“There is no scientific basis for constructing abortion 
as a severe physical or mental health threat.” (citation omitted)); Nancy F. Russo & Jean E. Denious, 
Violence in the Lives of Women Having Abortions: Implications for Practice and Public Policy, 32 
PROF. PSYCHOL. 142, 142 (2001) (“When history of abuse, partner characteristics, and background 
variables were controlled, abortion was not related to poorer mental health.”); Nada L. Stotland, The 
Myth of the Abortion Trauma Syndrome, 268 JAMA 2078, 2078 (1992) (“This is an article about a 
medical syndrome that does not exist.”).  See also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV) (4th ed. 1994) (postabortion syndrome not 
recognized).  During the Reagan years, proponents of postabortion syndrome sought government rec-
ognition of the syndrome by Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, who was a prominent opponent of 
abortion, but he concluded the claim lacked basis in evidence.  See infra notes 112–13 and accompany-
ing text. 
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traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal ideation.93  The Report finds that 
women who have abortions are more likely to have substance abuse 
problems, relationship and sexual problems, and parenting problems.94  
The Report also discusses studies suggesting that women who have abor-
tions are subsequently likely to be abusive or failed mothers,95 concluding 
that 
The Task Force finds that it is simply unrealistic to expect that a 
pregnant mother is capable of being involved in the termination of 
the life of her own child without risk of suffering significant psycho-
logical trauma and distress.  To do so is beyond the normal, natural, 
and healthy capability of a woman whose natural instincts are to 
protect and nurture her child.96  
Physical harm.  The Task Force Report contains an equally lengthy 
section on the physical health risks that abortion poses to women.  This 
section disputes findings of the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and 
asserts that women who have abortions are “at an increased risk of 
physical injury” and death than women who carry pregnancies to term.97  
Specifically, the Task Force Report challenges Planned Parenthood’s 
claim, based on CDC mortality statistics, that full-term pregnancies are 
several times more likely to result in death than early-term abortions.  
According to the Task Force Report, “the vast majority of deaths” stem 
from causes that the CDC does not connect to abortion, including sui-
cides, homicides, accidental injuries, unspecified “physical complica-
tions,” and “cancers in which abortions may be a significant contributing 
factor.”98  The Report asserts that the question “whether abortion causes 
an increased risk for breast cancer cannot be answered by this Task 
Force based on the record,” but concludes that “the reasons to suspect a 
connection [are] sufficiently sound” to call for further research.99  The 
Task Force Report arrives at this conclusion without discussing the most 
comprehensive studies to date, by the New England Journal of Medicine 
in 1997 and the National Cancer Institute (NCI) in 2003, which find no 
connection between abortion and breast cancer.100  The Report instead 
 
 93. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 43–44. 
 94. Id. at 43–45. 
 95. Id. at 43–47. 
 96. Id. at 47–48. 
 97. Id. at 48–52. 
 98. Id. at 48–50. 
 99. The Task Force Report states: 
The question concerning whether abortion causes an increased risk for breast cancer cannot be 
answered by this Task Force based on the record.  However, the subject is of vital importance and 
the reasons to suspect such a connection sufficiently sound.  We conclude that further study of 
this topic is justified and needed.  Sorting out the science and truth of this matter is of the utmost 
importance so that relevant informed consent information can be provided to women considering 
an abortion. 
Id. at 52. 
 100. See Collaborative Group on Hormonal Factors in Breast Cancer, Breast Cancer and Abor-
tion: Collaborative Reanalysis of Data from 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with 
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relies on the testimony of Joel Brind, a pro-life biochemist whose Breast 
Cancer Prevention Institute argues for the link.101 
At root, the Report’s argument for protecting women against abor-
tion turns on a claim about women’s nature.  Women who have abortions 
are mistaken or misled or coerced or pressured into decision they do not 
want to make and should not make because abortion violates women’s 
nature as mothers: 
[T]his method of waiver of the mother’s rights expects far too much 
of the mother.  It is so far outside the normal conduct of a mother 
to implicate herself in the killing of her own child.  Either the abor-
tion provider must deceive the mother into thinking the unborn 
child does not yet exist, and thereby induce her consent without be-
ing informed, or the abortion provider must encourage her to defy 
her very nature as a mother to protect her child.  Either way, this 
method of waiver denigrates her rights to reach a decision for her-
self.102 
As this summary of the Task Force Report illustrates, the South 
Dakota Legislature prohibited abortion in order to protect unborn life 
and to protect women who might decide to have an abortion.  The Legis-
 
Breast Cancer from 16 Countries, 363 LANCET 1007, 1007 (2004) (“Pregnancies that end as a sponta-
neous or induced abortion do not increase a woman’s risk of developing breast cancer.”); Mads Mel-
bye et al., Induced Abortion and the Risk of Breast Cancer, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 81, 84 (1997); Na-
tional Cancer Institute, Fact Sheet: Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk (May 30, 2003), 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/abortion-miscarriage (review of relevant literature 
concluding that “newer studies consistently showed no association between induced and spontaneous 
abortions and breast cancer risk”); National Cancer Institute, Summary Report: Early Reproductive 
Events and Breast Cancer Workshop (Mar. 25, 2003), http://www.cancer.gov/cancerinfo/ere-workshop 
-report (rating as “well established” the conclusion that “[i]nduced abortion is not associated with an 
increase in breast cancer risk”); see also World Health Organization, Fact Sheet No. 240: Induced 
Abortion Does Not Increase Breast Cancer Risk (June 2000), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ 
factsheets/fs240/en/index.html (“Two major studies have been carried out using this methodology [his-
torical cohort studies], and neither found an increased risk of breast cancer associated with first trimes-
ter abortion.”). 
U.S. Representative Henry Waxman has recently commissioned a report that described the findings 
of prominent professional and governmental authorities: 
There is a medical consensus that there is no causal relationship between abortion and breast 
cancer.  This consensus emerged after several well-designed studies, the largest of which was pub-
lished in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1997, found no indication of increased risk of 
breast cancer following an induced abortion.  In 2002, the Bush Administration edited a National 
Cancer Institute website to suggest that there was still an open scientific question about whether 
having an abortion might lead to breast cancer.  After Rep. Waxman and other members of Con-
gress protested the change, the National Cancer Institute convened a three-day conference of ex-
perts on abortion and breast cancer.  Participants reviewed all existing population-based, clinical, 
and animal data available.  Their conclusion was that “[i]nduced abortion is not associated with 
an increase in breast cancer risk.”  The panel ranked this conclusion as “[w]ell-established.” 
MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, FALSE AND 
MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE 
CENTERS 7–8 (2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20060717101140-30092.pdf 
[hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT] (footnotes omitted).  For a description of these debates over the 
claimed link between abortion and breast cancer, see CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON 
SCIENCE 205–07 (2005). 
 101. MOONEY, supra note 100, at 205; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 41. 
 102. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 56. 
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lature claimed that women who have abortions have not knowingly and 
willingly chosen the procedure because they were misled or pressured 
into the decision, or should not have chosen the procedure because it 
violates women’s “very nature as a mother.”103 
These claims are not unique to South Dakota.  The Task Force Re-
port relies extensively on evidence and arguments from the national anti-
abortion movement.  It is worth pausing to consider the reasoning of the 
national authorities on which the Task Force Report relies, before going 
on to consider the constitutional implications of the Report’s justifica-
tions for banning abortion. 
D. Fetal-Focused and Gender-Based Arguments Against Abortion: 
National Authorities on Which the South Dakota Task Force Relies 
In the last several decades there has been an important shift in the 
dominant forms of antiabortion argument.  In the 1970s and 1980s, ar-
guments against abortion commonly focused on the unborn.  Today, 
however, gender-based arguments against abortion are commonplace.  
Gender-based arguments against abortion embed claims about protect-
ing the unborn in an elaborate set of arguments about protecting women.  
As we have seen, the criminal ban on abortion recently enacted in South 
Dakota is justified through such gender-based arguments.  In what fol-
lows, I consider the gender-based argument against abortion as it has 
been elaborated by authorities in the national antiabortion movement 
that are cited and extensively relied upon in the South Dakota Task 
Force Report. 
1. Distinguishing Fetal-Focused and Gender-Based Arguments Against 
Abortion 
The traditional, fetal-focused argument against abortion elevates 
the value of protecting unborn life over any other concern.  On the fetal-
focused view, a human being is formed at conception of equal moral 
value to born persons; there is (virtually) no justification for ending that 
life; hence abortion is murder.  On the fetal-focused view, the interests of 
the unborn trump the interests of women.  It is more important to pro-
tect unborn life than to protect the pregnant woman’s liberty and wel-
fare.  This view dominated the antiabortion movement in the 1970s and 
1980s.  In this period, it was a common complaint of those defending the 
abortion right that their opponents argued the morality and constitution-
ality of abortion in ways that completely effaced women.104  Analyzing 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. In the 1980s, the argument for protecting the unborn was a central focus of the antiabortion 
movement’s case.  Proponents of the abortion right objected that arguments against abortion ignored 
women and employed scientific evidence about the development of unborn life in ways that erased 
and excluded the pregnant woman from the frame of debate.  See Siegel, supra note 29, at 325 (analyz-
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the visual imagery of the antiabortion film The Silent Scream in the mid-
1980s, Rosalind Petchesky observed: “From their beginning, such photo-
graphs have represented the fetus as primary and autonomous, the 
woman as absent or peripheral.”105  In this era the antiabortion move-
ment’s argument was so focused on the unborn that it took a sociologist 
interviewing movement leaders to demonstrate how arguments about 
abortion reflected judgments about women.106 
As the South Dakota abortion ban vividly illustrates, however, 
there is another form of argument that is widespread in the antiabortion 
movement today.  Gender-based arguments against abortion contend 
that restrictions on abortion protect both women and the unborn.  As we 
will see, the new gender-based arguments against abortion define 
women’s needs and interests through motherhood, and so insist that 
there is no conflict of needs or interests between women and the children 
they bear.  If the mantra of the fetal-focused argument is “abortion is 
murder,” the mantra of the gender-based argument is “abortion hurts 
women.” 
Since the feminist movement advanced claims to reproductive lib-
erty and equality in the period before Roe, there have been women who 
argued against the abortion right on the ground that abortion hurts 
women.107  But in arguing that abortion hurts women, these 1970s femi-
nists were criticizing social norms and institutions that made conceiving, 
bearing, and rearing children sites of disempowerment for women—a 
claim that nowhere appears in the South Dakota Task Force Report.  The 
argument that abortion hurts women first assumed the medicalized form 
 
ing physiological evidence and argument deployed in the abortion debate during the 1980s and observ-
ing that “[e]ver since physicians of the nineteenth century employed physiological arguments to attack 
quickening doctrine, it has been possible to reason about the embryo/fetus and the dynamics of human 
development in scientific ways that do not refer to the physical and social work of reproduction that 
women perform”). 
 105. See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 268 (1987); see also THE SILENT SCREAM (American Portrait 
Films 1984), available at http://www.silentscream.org/video1.htm.  The Silent Scream argues the case 
against abortion as a question concerning the importance of protecting unborn life.  Although the vis-
ual and narrative argument of the film is paradigmatically fetal focused, the film, at several junctures, 
gives voice to gender-based arguments against abortion that were then just beginning to circulate.  See 
Silent Scream, The Silent Scream Script & Photos, http://www.silentscream.org/silent_e.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2007) (“In discussing abortion we must also understand that the unborn child is not the 
only victim.  Women themselves are victims, just as the unborn children are.  Women have not been 
told the true nature of the unborn child.  They have not been shown the true facts of what an abortion 
truly is.  Women in increasing numbers . . . hundreds . . . thousands . . . and even tens of thousands 
have had their wombs perforated, infected, destroyed.  Women have been sterilized, castrated, all as a 
result which they have had no true knowledge.  This film and other films which may follow like it, 
must be a part of the informed consent for any woman before she submits herself to a procedure of 
this sort.”). 
 106. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984). 
 107. Feminists for Life, which was formed by two antiabortion exiles from the National Organiza-
tion for Women in 1972, argued that abortion harms women individually and as an oppressed class.  
See Cindy Osborne, Pat Goltz, Catherine Callaghan and the Founding of Feminists for Life, in 
PROLIFE FEMINISM YESTERDAY & TODAY 151–54 (Mary Krane Derr et al. eds., 1995). 
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employed by the South Dakota Task Force in the early 1980s, when Vin-
cent Rue invoked the then-new concept of post-traumatic syndrome to 
describe the harms of abortion.  This medico-psychological argument was 
then embraced by women in the antiabortion movement as a frame for 
organizing Women Exploited By Abortion (WEBA).108 
“Postabortion syndrome,” or PAS, as its proponents now call it, ac-
quired a variety of advocates.  In 1986, Reverend Jerry Falwell advanced 
gender-based arguments against abortion in If I Should Die Before I 
Wake.109  A year later, David Reardon published Aborted Women: Silent 
No More,110 a collection of testimonials by abortion “survivors,” and went 
on to found the Elliot Institute, a center dedicated to educating the anti-
abortion movement and voters across the country about the dangers of 
postabortion syndrome.111  During this period, leaders of the antiabortion 
movement urged President Ronald Reagan’s Surgeon General, C. 
Everett Koop, to make official findings that abortion posed a public 
health threat to women, on the model of the antismoking campaign.112  
But Koop, who was a prominent and passionate opponent of abortion, 
refused, concluding instead that there was insufficient scientific evidence 
to support the claim and urging that the movement keep its moral focus 
on protecting unborn life, rather than diverting the argument into what 
he saw as irrelevant and unproven claims about women.113 
Despite this early defeat, advocates of the argument remained con-
vinced of its strategic importance.  Throughout the 1990s, a small but 
growing group of antiabortion advocates continued looking for ways to 
develop the gender-based or woman-protective antiabortion argument, 
 
 108. In 1982, following a speech by Rue to the National Right to Life Committee convention, pro-
life women who had had abortions formed WEBA.  See Olivia Gans, When the Mothers Found Their 
Voice, http://www.nrlc.org/news/1998/NRL1.98/oliva.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 109. See JERRY FALWELL, IF I SHOULD DIE BEFORE I WAKE (1986). 
 110. DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN, SILENT NO MORE (1987). 
 111. Reardon founded the Elliot Institute in 1988.  See AfterAbortion.org, Elliot Who?, 
http://www.afterabortion.info/elliot.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 112. See C. EVERETT KOOP, KOOP: THE MEMOIRS OF AMERICA’S FAMILY DOCTOR 270, 274–77 
(1991) (recounting the author’s efforts to negotiate administration and movement politics); Ellie Lee, 
Reinventing Abortion as a Social Problem: “Postabortion Syndrome” in the United States and Britain, 
in HOW CLAIMS SPREAD: CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFUSION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 39, 55 (Joel Best ed., 
2001) (recounting development of the postabortion syndrome argument during the Reagan years); 
More on Koop’s Study of Abortion, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 36 (1990) (recounting struggles within the 
Reagan administration over Koop’s inquiry); Siegel, supra note 5 (situating Koop episode in early his-
tory of claim’s dissemination). 
 113. For Koop’s statement, see Medical and Psychological Impact of Abortion: Hearing Before the 
Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 
101st Cong. 193–95 (1989).  For Koop’s critique of the postabortion syndrome argument, see KOOP, 
supra note 112, at 274–75, 278 (“The pro-life movement had always focused—rightly, I thought—on 
the impact of abortion on the fetus.  They lost their bearings when they approached the issue on the 
grounds of the health effect on the mother.”).  For another antiabortion advocate’s critique of 
Reardon’s woman-protective arguments against abortion, see Francis J. Beckwith, Taking Abortion 
Seriously: A Philosophical Critique of the New Anti-Abortion Rhetorical Shift, 17 ETHICS & MED. 155, 
162 (2001). 
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with Jack Willke of the National Right to Life Committee and David 
Reardon playing leading roles among them. 
2. The Logic of the Gender-Based Antiabortion Argument 
The gender-based antiabortion argument has many proponents, in-
cluding Jack Willke and Wanda Franz of the National Right to Life 
Committee, postabortion syndrome theorist Vincent Rue, “Baby M” 
lawyer Harold Cassidy, and conservative advocacy groups such as the 
Family Research Council, Concerned Women for America, and Focus on 
the Family.114  But the argument’s most prolific advocate is David 
Reardon, who publishes books that combine moral arguments that abor-
tion is against women’s nature with medical arguments demonstrating 
how abortion harms women’s health and political analyses demonstrating 
how making this argument can win elections. 
David Reardon’s 1996 book Making Abortion Rare115 explained to 
allies in the antiabortion movement that the movement could not con-
tinue to emphasize arguments that privilege the interests of the unborn 
over the interests of the born if the movement wanted to persuade swing 
voters concerned with women’s welfare.  Instead, Reardon argued, the 
movement should emphasize that restrictions on abortion are in women’s 
interest: 
The abortion debate has typically been framed as a conflict between 
women’s rights and the rights of the unborn.  Pro-abortionists have 
consciously defined the issue in these terms to polarize public opin-
ion and paralyze the middle majority—the “fence sitting” 50 per-
cent or more who feel torn between the woman and the child—so 
they will remain neutral. 
Unfortunately, many pro-lifers are all too willing to accept this 
characterization of the issue.  In practice, they even reinforce it by 
rushing to announce the conclusion, which the middle majority re-
fuses to embrace, that the right of the unborn child to live must al-
ways prevail over the needs and desires of the woman.  This conclu-
sion, however morally sound, does not help the middle majority in 
its search to escape the paralysis of compassion for both the unborn 
and their mothers. 
 
 114. See, e.g., JACK C. WILLKE, WHY NOT LOVE THEM BOTH? QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
ABOUT ABORTION (3d ed. 1997); Harold J. Cassidy & Associates, http://www.haroldcassidy.com (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2007); Concerned Women for America, supra note 5; Kenneth L. Connor, Panel on 
the Pro-Life Movement at Thirty: A Political Assessment, Family Research Council Symposium at the 
National Press Club (Jan. 16, 2003), http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=PD03G01; National Right to Life 
Committee, Abortion: Some Medical Facts, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/ASMF/asmf14.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2007); ThinkAboutIt Online—It’s About Women, http://www.thinkaboutitonline.com/ 
women/A000000011.cfm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007); see also supra note 5 (documenting the spread of 
woman-protective antiabortion argument in the national movement). 
 115. DAVID C. REARDON, MAKING ABORTION RARE: A HEALING STRATEGY FOR A DIVIDED 
NATION (1996). 
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. . . . 
To truly reframe the political debate to our advantage, it is not 
enough to simply highlight the part of the frame touching on the 
rights of the unborn.  Instead, we must expand the frame to include 
more parties, so that we can convincingly show that it is we who are 
defending the authentic rights of both women and children.  In 
short, we must insist that the proper frame for the abortion issue is 
not women’s rights versus unborn children’s rights, but rather 
women’s and children’s rights versus the schemes of exploiters and 
the profits of the abortion industry.116 
How could the antiabortion strategist resolve the tension between 
the rights of women and the unborn?  Reardon advocated that antiabor-
tion activists begin to present themselves as “pro-woman”: 
We all know that pro-lifers have always shown compassion for 
women. . . . But this compassion has often been hidden behind the 
scenes in public debates which have been reduced to battles over 
women’s rights versus the rights of the unborn.  The solution to this 
bad publicity is to always—ALWAYS—place our arguments for the 
unborn in the middle of a pro-woman sandwich.  Our compassion 
for the women must be voiced both first and last in all our argu-
ments, and in a manner which shows that our concern for women is 
a primary and integral part of our opposition to abortion. 
. . . . 
Accepting the fact that the middle majority’s concerns are 
primarily focused on the woman is a prerequisite to developing a 
successful pro-woman/pro-life strategy.  Rather than trying to re-
duce public sympathy for women, we want to increase it and align it 
with our own outrage at how women are being victimized.117 
Rather than oppose claims for women’s rights, Reardon proposed that 
the antiabortion movement incorporate claims for women’s rights into its 
case against abortion.  At its core, the strategy involves countering and 
appropriating the authority of women’s rights talk—especially its claim 
to respect women’s choices.118  Reardon and his allies argued that the an-
tiabortion movement needed to 
 
 116. Id. at 32–33; see also David C. Reardon, A Defense of the Neglected Rhetorical Strategy, 12 
LIFE & LEARNING 77, 79 (2002), available at http://www.uffl.org/vol12/reardon12.pdf (“The failure of 
the traditional pro-life strategy is not in its moral reasoning. . . . Our argument is simply that pro-life 
efforts will be more effective to the degree that we succeed in presenting a moral vision that consis-
tently demonstrates just as much concern for women as for their unborn children.  Discussion of the 
harm that abortion does to women and of programs to promote post-abortion healing for women who 
have suffered that harm do not replace advocacy for the rights of unborn children.  They simply 
broaden the base of arguments against abortion.”). 
 117. REARDON, supra note 115, at 26–27 (second emphasis added). 
 118. See id. at 96–97 (“[Pro-choice advocates] claim to be concerned about the welfare and 
autonomy of women.  We claim to be more concerned, for the very good reason that abortion is injur-
ing women, not helping them. . . . [O]ur pro-woman bill . . . increases the rights of women by simply 
ensuring that their decisions to accept a recommendation for abortion are fully voluntary and fully 
informed.”); id. at 142–46. 
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take back the terms “freedom of choice” and “reproductive free-
dom” . . . . to emphasize the fact that we are the ones who are really 
defending the right of women to make an informed choice; we are 
the ones who are defending the freedom of women to reproduce 
without fear of being coerced into unwanted abortions.119 
He advised: 
By increasing public empathy for the suffering of women who have 
had abortions, by emphasizing the fact that women are being ex-
ploited by the abortion industry and coerced by others into un-
wanted abortions, and by focusing on expanding the legal rights of 
women to seek redress, we are aligning our interests with those of 
the middle majority in a way which advances our political agenda.120 
Of course, to integrate a women’s rights claim into an antiabortion 
argument, the claim must be carefully defined.  Reardon describes the 
understanding of women on which the “pro-woman” argument against 
abortion is based: 
[F]rom a natural law perspective, we can know in advance that 
abortion is inherently harmful to women.  It is simply impossible to 
rip a child from the womb of a mother without tearing out a part of 
the woman herself—a part of her heart, a part of her joy, a part of 
her maternity. 
. . . . 
If there is a single principle, then, which lies at the heart of the 
pro-woman/pro-life agenda, it would have to be this: the best inter-
ests of the child and the mother are always joined.  This is true even 
if the mother does not initially realize it, and even if she needs a 
tremendous amount of love and help to see it.  Thus, the only way 
that we can help either the mother or her child is to help both.  
Conversely, if we hurt either, we hurt both.121 
Properly understood, the interests of women and the unborn are conver-
gent and harmonious; abortion harms women and the unborn both.  
“The abortion debate, then, is not about women’s rights versus the rights 
of the unborn, because the rights of mother and her child can never be 
truly opposed to each other.”122  Pro-woman discourse dissolves the con-
flict between women’s and children’s interests by addressing women as 
caregivers whose interests are realized in protecting and providing for 
their children.  Because abortion violates women’s role as mothers, it is 
inherently harmful to women. 
During the last two decades, Reardon and others have succeeded in 
persuading growing numbers of antiabortion advocates to adopt this ap-
proach, which a critic in the antiabortion movement calls “the new rhe-
 
 119. Id. at 96. 
 120. Id. at 26. 
 121. Id. at 5–6. 
 122. Paul Marx, Book Review, http://www.afterabortion.info/marreview.html (last visited Mar. 19, 
2007) (reviewing REARDON, supra note 115). 
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torical strategy.”123  Proponents of the new rhetorical strategy contend 
that the movement needs to persuade a divided public that abortion re-
strictions protect women’s welfare and freedom before it can persuade a 
divided public to protect the unborn.124 
 
 123. Beckwith, supra note 113, at 155; see also id. at 157 (criticizing Reardon’s argument on the 
grounds that “[the new rhetorical strategy] may have the unfortunate consequence of sustaining and 
perhaps increasing the number of people who think that unless their needs are pacified they are per-
fectly justified in performing homicide on those members of the human community, who pro-lifers 
believe, are the most vulnerable of our population.  It is difficult to imagine that any reflective pro-
lifer would think society would be morally better off in such a state of affairs.”).  Beckwith also ques-
tions the social science claims on which the postabortion syndrome theory rests.  See id. at 158 (“One 
can question whether the research done by [new rhetorical strategy] proponents are examples of good 
social science, and whether the inferences they draw from these data are warranted.”). 
 124. For retrospective accounts of this shift in the argument of the antiabortion movement, see 
Francis J. Beckwith, Choice Words: A Critique of the New Pro-Life Rhetoric, TOUCHSTONE: J. MERE 
CHRISTIANITY, Jan./Feb. 2004, available at http://www.touchstonemag.com/archives/article.php?id=17-
01-056-o (featuring main article by Beckwith and separate responses by Frederica Mathewes-Green, 
David Mills, and Terry Schlossberg).  As Frederica Mathewes-Green, longtime member of Feminists 
for Life, recalls the emergence of this new rhetorical strategy: 
The “new rhetorical strategy” that Francis Beckwith critiques is getting up in years.  My first 
book, Real Choices: Listening to Women, Looking for Alternatives to Abortion, was written in 
1993.  The Caring Foundation’s first ads appeared in the mid-nineties, as did Paul Swopes’s essay 
in First Things describing the results of their research.  David Reardon’s book Aborted Women: 
Silent No More appeared in 1987. 
Beckwith might have mentioned as well Dr. Jack Willke’s early-nineties project to develop a 
concise response to the other side’s “Who decides?” rhetoric (you may have seen “Love them 
both” placards) and the trend of pregnancy care centers to shift focus, changing from storefronts 
that discourage abortion to full-fledged medical clinics or professional counseling centers.  The 
so-called “new” rhetorical strategies (for there are more than one) have been around for over a 
decade.  No one yet, to my knowledge, has evaluated their success, though that would be a useful 
service; we’re still in the middle of this fight. 
How it happened was this: Pro-life leaders noticed that the primary message of the previous 
couple of decades, our insistence on the unborn child’s full humanity and right to life, was no 
longer gaining ground.  We had honed this message and it was ubiquitous and consistent, and we 
personally found it unassailable.  Yet we were increasingly encountering people capable of dis-
missing it.  Perhaps all the people susceptible to it had already been reached and converted.  For 
the remainder, whom we termed “the mushy middle,” it was falling on deaf ears.  We didn’t know 
why. 
. . . . 
One option might have been to back off from pressing the pro-life cause and undertake a 
broader national effort in remedial moral education.  But most of us decided instead to attempt to 
get around this surprising roadblock by other means.  We diversified, each person and group try-
ing out strategies as they occurred to them.  Some, of course, would continue to present the “It’s a 
baby and it deserves protection” message.  This is the backbone of the pro-life movement and our 
final motivation, and we aren’t about to abandon it. 
But others looked at subsets of the pro-choice population and began crafting ways to reach 
them. 
Frederica Mathewes-Green, Doing Everything We Can: A Response to Francis J. Beckwith, 
TOUCHSTONE: J. MERE CHRISTIANITY, Jan./Feb. 2004, available at http://www.touchstonemag.com/ 
archives/article.php?id=17-01-056-o. 
Reardon also reports on the efforts of Jack Willke, former president of the National Right to Life 
Committee, to reconstruct the antiabortion message in the early 1990s.  He recounts Willke shifting 
from a wholly fetal-focused argument to a gender-based argument, with dramatically improved results: 
“In essence, the Willkes have sandwiched fetal development between two layers of pro-woman com-
passion.  According to Dr. Willke, ‘The result has been almost dramatic. . . . The anger and combat-
iveness are gone.  The questions are civil.  We are listened to once again.’”  REARDON, supra note 115, 
at 26; see also Joe Scheidler & Ann Scheidler, Controversy in the Activist Movement, PRO-LIFE 
ACTION NEWS, Aug. 2002, http://www.prolifeaction.org/news/2002v21n2/controversy.htm (“As Dr. 
Jack Willke has said for over three decades, ‘Why can’t we love them both?’”). 
SIEGEL.DOC 4/12/2007  5:03:49 PM 
No. 3] WOMAN-PROTECTIVE ABORTION RESTRICTIONS 1021 
In Making Abortion Rare, Reardon advances this gender-based ar-
gument against abortion in three dimensions: as an argument about poli-
tics (the rhetorical “frames” in which to win the abortion debate), an ar-
gument about morality (a revelation of natural or divine law), and an 
argument about science (public health).  Reardon views each of these 
forms of reasoning as consistent with, and even an integral aspect of, the 
other: as the book explains, “the morality of abortion is built right into 
the psychological effects of abortion.”125  Reardon has elsewhere ob-
served: “I do argue that because abortion is evil, we can expect, and even 
know, that it will harm those who participate in it.  Nothing good comes 
from evil.”126  “If an action is indeed against God’s moral law, it will be 
found to be injurious to our happiness. . . . [I]t is entirely consistent with 
a Christian view of morality to believe that because abortion is morally 
wrong, women will suffer.”127  Reardon views his empirical research on 
the psychological consequences of abortion at the Elliot Institute as 
documenting the moral evil of abortion.128 
Abortion is not evil primarily because it harms women.  Instead, it 
is precisely because of its evil as a direct attack on the good of life 
that we can know it will ultimately harm women.  While the research 
we are doing is necessary to document abortion’s harm, good moral 
reasoning helps us to anticipate the results.129 
Reardon is frank in discussing his belief that empirical inquiry is a 
branch of moral reasoning.  He is equally frank in discussing the political 
advantage of expressing judgments about morality and religion as em-
pirical claims.  In Making Abortion Rare, Reardon explains to Christian 
audiences that proving the public health harms of abortion will demon-
strate abortion’s moral wrong in terms that command authority for secu-
lar audiences who will not vote in accord with appeals to divine com-
mand: 
Christians rightly anticipate . . . that any advantage gained through 
violation of the moral law is always temporary; it will invariably be 
supplanted by alienation and suffering. 
Thus, if our faith is true, we would expect to find compelling 
evidence which demonstrates that such acts as abortion, fornication, 
and pornography lead, in the end, not to happiness and freedom, 
 
For a social movement history of woman-protective antiabortion argument, which traces its evolu-
tion from a therapeutic discourse employed to recruit supporters at the movement’s crisis pregnancy 
centers to a political discourse strategically designed to quell concerns of the general voting public, see 
Siegel, supra note 5. 
 125. REARDON, supra note 115, at 10. 
 126. Reardon, supra note 116, at 4. 
 127. Id. at 6, 8. 
 128. See, for example, the Elliot Institute’s A List of Major Psychological Sequelae of Abortion, 
http://www.afterabortion.info/psychol.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
 129. An Interview with Dr. David C. Reardon, Director of the Elliot Institute, ZENIT NEWS 
AGENCY, May 12, 2003, available at http://www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=35425 (empha-
sis added). 
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but to sorrow and enslavement.  By finding this evidence and shar-
ing it with others, we bear witness to the protective good of God’s 
law in a way which even unbelievers must respect.130 
Making Abortion Rare advises that advocates employ this new 
woman-protective justification for restricting abortion in politics and in 
therapy.  Gender-based arguments against abortion guide the counseling 
provided at the Elliot Institute and at other “crisis pregnancy centers” 
(CPCs), which encourage women to continue pregnancies and which 
help “postabortive” women recognize that they are symptomatic because 
they are in denial about the trauma of their past abortions.131  Making 
Abortion Rare also advises politicians about how to advance gender-
based antiabortion arguments in support of hypothetical or proposed leg-
islation.  Reardon encourages politicians to advocate incrementalist 
methods of limiting abortion in the manner advocated by Americans 
United for Life,132 including: 
1) Protecting women from being coerced into unwanted abor-
tions; 
2) Guaranteeing the right of women to make free and fully in-
formed decisions about abortion; 
3) Protecting the women most likely to be injured by abortion 
by requiring physicians to properly screen patients for char-
acteristics which would place them at higher risk of physical 
or psychological complications; and 
 
 130. REARDON, supra note 115, at 11; cf. Mathewes-Green, supra note 124 (“That’s my ‘new rhe-
torical strategy,’ and it was based on my own attempts to analyze the present problem and figure a way 
around it.  Others devised parallel approaches, and addressed different segments of society.  (I was 
mostly speaking on college campuses and in secular media, which is why I never brought in God-talk; 
for these audiences, it was immediate grounds for mental dismissal.)”). 
 131. Crisis pregnancy centers are volunteer organizations that discourage women from having 
abortions and provide emotional and material support during pregnancy and counseling to abortion 
“survivors.”  Most CPCs are religiously based, and since the mid-1980s have institutionalized posta-
bortion syndrome at the antiabortion movement’s grassroots by using it as a diagnostic instrument.  
Shawna Reeves Nourzaie, The Development of Post-Abortion Syndrome Within the Crisis Pregnancy 
Movement in America: A Historical-Theoretical Study 49–57 (2003) (unpublished M.S.W. Thesis, 
Smith College School for Social Work) (on file with author); see also Alexi A. Wright & Ingrid T. 
Katz, Roe Versus Reality—Abortion and Women’s Health, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2006) (describ-
ing religious antiabortion centers counseling pregnant women on postabortion syndrome theory). 
CPCs are now receiving increasing amounts of federal funding for counseling pregnant women, as 
well as those who have already had abortions, about the dangers abortion poses to women and the 
unborn.  According to a recent report in the Washington Post, CPCs and local antiabortion centers 
have received over $60 million in grants for abstinence education and other programs since 2001.  
State governments also provide funding to CPCs.  Thomas B. Edsall, Grants Flow to Bush Allies on 
Social Issues, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2006, at A4.  A recent report by Representative Henry Waxman 
critically analyzes the CPCs’ federal funding sources and methods of operation.  See WAXMAN 
REPORT, supra note 100. 
 132. Jeanne Cummings, Targeting Roe: In Abortion Fight, Little-Known Group Has Guiding 
Hand, WALL STREET J., Nov. 30, 2005, at A1. 
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4) Expanding the rights of injured patients to recover fair com-
pensation for physical or psychological harm resulting from 
abortion.133 
3. The Spread of the Gender-Based Antiabortion Argument 
The antiabortion movement has adopted the strategy for woman-
protective, choice-based, incrementalist restrictions on abortion that 
Reardon and others have advocated—a strategy that began before Casey 
and accelerated afterwards as the constitutional framework and political 
structure of the abortion debate evolved.134  In 2003, Clarke Forsythe, 
head of Americans United for Life—which coordinates the national leg-
islative strategy designed to chip away at Roe—reviewed the movement’s 
successes and failures, focusing on the movement’s need to counter the 
“myth” of abortion as a necessary evil.  The key, Forsythe concluded, is 
“to raise public consciousness of the negative impact of abortion on 
women.  If it can be shown that abortion harms women as well as the un-
born, it will not be seen as necessary.”135  To this end, in the last decade, 
the antiabortion movement has successfully enacted “right-to-know” 
laws in a majority of states that regulate abortion on the informed con-
sent model; some states now specifically require providers to give women 
information about “postabortion” symptoms that are scientifically dis-
puted.136  In 2005, South Dakota enacted the most far-reaching of these 
 
 133. REARDON, supra note 115, at 33; see also Editorial, Costly Gestures, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, 
Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/editorial/editors200603080804.asp (observing that “[p]ro-
lifers have gained ground over the last decade and a half by pursuing a savvy incremental strategy”).  
On incrementalist strategies within the national antiabortion movement, see Robin Toner, Step by 
Step: Abortion’s Opponents Claim the Middle Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, § 4, at 1 (interview-
ing advocates on both sides of the debate). 
 134. Lawyers interested in incrementalist methods of chipping away at Roe embraced informed 
consent as one such strategy for state legislation and mobilization, and began to focus on it in the years 
after Casey.  See Cummings, supra note 132.  For contemporary sources, see AMERICANS UNITED FOR 
LIFE, ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS (1987); 
Gregory Wilmoth, Abortion, Public Health Policy, and Informed Consent Legislation, 48 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 1 (1992).  Vincent Rue testified about postabortion syndrome in defense of the Pennsylvania 
informed consent statute at issue in Casey, but the district court, citing the Koop investigation, found 
his testimony “not credible.”  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1333–34 
(E.D. Pa. 1990).  Over time, and with the advocacy of Reardon and others, this legal strategy was de-
veloped as a basis of the woman-protective antiabortion argument. 
 135. Clark D. Forsythe, An Unnecessary Evil, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 2003, http://www.firstthings. 
com/article.php3?id_article=437. 
 136. Nevada cites the “‘physical and emotional implications of having [an] abortion,’” NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 442.253 (2007); and Michigan’s Department of Community Health warns that, “[w]hile rare, 
some women may experience depression, feelings of guilt, anger, sleep disturbance, or loss of interest 
in work or sex, as a result of an abortion.”  Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, Medication-Induced Abor-
tion, http://www.michigan.gov/mdch/0,1607,7-132-2940_4909_6437_19077-46297—,00.html (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2007).  See generally Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The 
Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Fall 
2006, at 6, 8 (“[M]edically inaccurate claims of a link between induced abortion and breast cancer can 
be found in the required abortion counseling materials in five of the six states that have developed 
such materials . . . . In two of these states, the health department was expressly directed by the legisla-
SIEGEL.DOC 4/12/2007  5:03:49 PM 
1024 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 
informed consent statutes—a statute that requires abortion providers to 
tell patients about characteristics of the unborn and the risks of the abor-
tion procedure to women and then to warrant that they believe their pa-
tients understand these facts under sanction of the criminal law.137  Ad-
vocating for such laws provides the antiabortion movement an 
opportunity to assert that abortions are the product of misinformation 
and coercion, and to advance the argument that abortions hurt women as 
well as the unborn.  The claim is also advanced by lawyers who bring tort 
suits against abortion providers based on various tenets of postabortion 
syndrome138 (e.g., complaining of a provider’s failure to warn patients of 
 
ture to include information on the abortion-breast cancer relationship . . . .”).  For discussion of the 
stereotypes about women these laws may reflect, see infra Part III.A. 
 137. South Dakota law provides, in addition to common law requirements of informed consent, 
an abortion decision is not informed and voluntary unless the physician certifies that the pregnant 
woman has read and the physician believes the patient understands a written statement explaining 
(b) That the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being; 
(c) That the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human being and that 
the relationship enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and under the laws of 
South Dakota; 
(d) That by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights 
with regards to that relationship will be terminated; 
(e) A description of all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically significant risk fac-
tors to which the pregnant woman would be subjected, including: 
(i) Depression and related psychological distress; 
(ii) Increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1) (2007).  If the pregnant woman asks for an explanation of any 
of these statements, the physician’s explanation must be in writing and must be made part of the per-
manent medical record of the patient.  Id.  The physician’s failure to comply is punishable as a misde-
meanor.  Enforcement of this statute was preliminarily enjoined first in Planned Parenthood Minne-
sota v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D.S.D. 2005), and again in Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. 
Rounds, No. Civ. 05-4077-KES, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72778, at *20 (D.S.D. Oct. 4, 2006).  The dis-
trict court’s grant of an injunction was affirmed by a panel of the Eighth Circuit, Planned Parenthood 
Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006), but the panel’s opinion was vacated by the Eighth Cir-
cuit en banc on January 9, 2007.  See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Alpha Ctr., No. 06-3142, 2007 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 1775, at *3 (8th Cir. Jan. 25, 2007) (recounting most recent procedural history).  For the 
legislative history of the statute, enacted in 2005 at the same time as the Task Force was created, see 
South Dakota Legislature, House Bill 1166, http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2005/1166.htm (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2007) (providing audio files of the Legislature’s hearings). 
 138. This litigation began in the 1990s.  See Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing 
the Common-Law Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 494–95.  Professor 
Northern noted that: 
There are increasing indications that abortion malpractice litigation is on the rise.  At least 
some of that litigation, moreover, may stem from pro-life advocates attempting to dissuade doc-
tors from performing abortions.  A 1995 article appearing in Medical Economics reports that 
there has been a significant increase in the number of medical malpractice actions filed alleging 
that the plaintiff was injured as a result of a negligently performed abortion procedure or the fail-
ure to provide informed consent to the procedure.  In 1995, there were initial reports of “the 
newest anti-abortion strategy—malpractice suits against the doctors who perform abortions.”  
One nonprofit group reported to have followed this strategy is Life Dynamics Inc., founded in 
1992 by Mark Crutcher.  The group reportedly engaged in legal research for expanding the kinds 
of cases brought against doctors who do abortions, solicited plaintiffs, and offered expert wit-
nesses on controversial issues such as postabortion trauma and the causal nexus between a higher 
risk of breast cancer and abortion.  In short, Life Dynamics offered to provide a panoply of ser-
vices to attorneys representing clients who allege abortion malpractice.  Life Dynamics, more-
over, apparently acknowledged that one of its purposes was to limit the availability of abortions.  
A 1992 antiabortion manual the group distributed urged support for abortion malpractice law-
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the breast cancer link or to advise them that the embryo/fetus is a 
“unique human being”).  Perhaps the most active lawyer advocating 
woman-protective antiabortion arguments is Harold Cassidy, the chief 
counsel from the Baby M surrogacy case,139 who has been representing 
CPCs as intervenors in litigation over South Dakota’s most recent right-
to-know statute.140 
Lawyers have used postabortion syndrome arguments in other 
abortion litigation, including efforts to reopen Roe v. Wade and Doe v. 
Bolton,141 as well as in amicus briefs in Supreme Court cases, such as the 
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act case that the Court is deciding this 
term.142  For example, Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum amicus brief applies 
 
suits “to protect women, but also to force abortionists out of business by driving up their insur-
ance rates.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Siegel, supra note 5 (discussing elaboration of the strategy of shutting 
down the provision of abortion services through malpractice litigation as it was first elaborated in the 
1980s). 
For a student comment discussing a class action tort claim on the model of the antismoking suit, see 
Justin D. Heminger, Comment, Big Abortion: What the Antiabortion Movement Can Learn from Big 
Tobacco, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1273 (2005). 
 139. In a recent New Jersey case, Cassidy represented a woman who brought action against her 
physician, asserting claims of medical malpractice, negligent infliction of emotional distress, lack of 
informed consent, and wrongful death.  The court remanded the case, holding that a genuine issue of 
material fact existed (“i.e., what medical information is material and must be disclosed by an obstetri-
cian when advising a patient to terminate a pregnancy and what medical information is material when 
the patient asks if the ‘baby’ is already ‘there?’”).  Acuna v. Turkish, 894 A.2d 1208, 1214 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. 2006).  Cassidy also recently filed a class action complaint against Planned Parenthood/Chicago 
Area for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress, alleging that the defendants 
failed “to make proper disclosures of material facts” and made “false statements of fact to plaintiff and 
others similarly situated.”  Complaint at 2, Mary Doe v. Planned Parenthood (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 7, 2006) 
(unpublished complaint on file with author). 
For an account of Cassidy’s advocacy efforts, see Kathleen Cassidy, Post-Abortive Women Attack 
Roe v. Wade, AT THE CENTER, Winter 2001, http://www.atcmag.com/v2n1/article6.asp; Jeffrey Gold, 
NJ Court Allows Jury to Consider if Doc Misled Woman on Abortion, Apr. 7, 2006, 
PHILLYBURBS.COM, http://www.phillyburbs.com/pb-dyn/news/104-04072006-638234.html (discussing 
New Jersey tort suit in which Cassidy is lawyer). 
 140. Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, No. Civ.05-4077 KES, 2005 WL 2338863 (D.S.D. 
Sept. 23, 2005) (order granting motion to intervene); see supra note 137. 
 141. Norma McCorvey, the Roe of Roe v. Wade who has now become an antiabortion advocate, 
filed a suit in Texas, later appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the factual grounds upon which 
the Supreme Court based its ruling have been shown to be wrong, and therefore the judgment should 
be reviewed under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Her suit was denied, but Judge 
Edith Jones filed a concurrence to her own opinion for the court essentially saying she agreed with the 
over one thousand affidavits from women who claimed their abortions “had a negative effect upon 
their lives.”  McCorvey v. Hill, No. Civ.A. 303CV1340N, 2003 WL 21448388 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2003), 
aff’d, 385 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Jason A. Adkins, Meet Me at the (West Coast) Hotel: The 
Lochner Era and the Demise of Roe v. Wade, 90 MINN. L. REV. 500 (2005) (analyzing McCorvey).  On 
efforts to reopen the companion case in Roe, see infra note 142. 
 142. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1607 (2006).  One amicus brief provides the Carhart Court 
extensive postabortion syndrome testimonials of the kind that South Dakota considered.  Brief of 
Sandra Cano, the former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, & 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1607 (2006) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 
1436684.  One hundred eighty “post-abortive” women joined Sandra Cano’s brief, which offers ninety-
six pages of excerpts from affidavits testifying to “their real life experiences” of how “abortion in prac-
tice hurts women’s health.”  Id. at 2.  The brief informs the Court that the affidavits provided were 
merely a sampling from “approximately 2,000 on file with The Justice Foundation.”  Id. app. B; see 
also id. at 9, 12–13 (comparing abortion to silicone breast implants, maintaining that women should 
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the postabortion syndrome argument to Gonzales v. Carhart: “There 
should be no judicially imposed health exception to a procedure that is, 
in fact, so harmful to health.  Imagine the absurdity of a judicially im-
posed health exception to a ban on smoking.”143 
The woman-protective antiabortion arguments supporting South 
Dakota’s ban are thus the work of the national movement over the last 
several decades.  The state likewise relied on the national movement for 
the evidence the state cited in support of its claims.  The approximately 
2000 abortion testimonies cited in the South Dakota Task Force Report 
were supplied by Operation Outcry,144 a division of the Justice Founda-
tion.145  Operation Outcry testimonies have since been entered as evi-
 
not be afforded the opportunity to choose such a “dangerous and risky procedure” and likening the 
psychological state of women postabortion to the mental harm suffered by child pornography survi-
vors). 
Other amici briefs in Carhart argue that abortions harm women.  See Brief Amici Curiae of the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops & Other Religious Organizations in Support of Peti-
tioner at 17, Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1607 (2006) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436693 (stating that 
the finding in Roe that “abortion is safer than childbirth has come under serious challenge” (citation 
omitted)); Brief of Gianna Jessen, Zachary Klopfenstein (by and through his Parents, Terry and Jill 
Klopfenstein), & the Center for Moral Clarity as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16–20, Gon-
zales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1607 (2006) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436685 (detailing the so-called partial 
birth abortion procedure in order to document its potential to create psychological trauma); Brief of 
John M. Thorp, Jr., M.D. & Matercare International as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17, 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1607 (2006) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436682 (arguing that abortion is 
“affirmatively dangerous enough that a legislative body is within its constitutional authority to entirely 
prohibit the matter as a danger to public health”). 
 143. Brief of Amici Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in Support of Peti-
tioner at 21, Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1607 (2006) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436691.  An entire 
section of the Eagle Forum brief is entitled “Performed Under the Guise of ‘Health’, Abortions Have 
a Very Unhealthy Effect,” id. at 17–21, and asserts that 
“[h]igher death rates associated with abortion persist over time and across socioeconomic 
boundaries.”  Women who have a family history of breast cancer or other illnesses may be giving 
themselves the medical equivalent of a death sentence by submitting to an abortion.  Even abor-
tion advocates must concede that childbirth has a protective health effect lost to women who un-
dergo abortion. 
Id. at 18 (citations omitted). 
The American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) also compares abortion to smoking.  In an 
amicus brief filed in Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood, a second challenge to the Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban granted certiorari to the Supreme Court, the ACLJ argues that “[a] fair comparison of abortion 
with continued childbearing, like a fair comparison of smoking with nonsmoking, would have to take 
into account not just immediate consequences, but also all other statistically significant increased 
death risks.”  Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Petitioner at 7, 
Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006) (No. 05-1382), 2006 WL 
2317063.  The ACLJ was founded by Pat Robertson, and is currently led by Chief Counsel Jay Seku-
low.  Marc Fisher, Unlikely Crusaders: Jay Sekulow, “Messianic Jew” of the Christian Right, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 21, 1997, at D1; American Center for Law & Justice, supra note 66. 
 144. “OPERATION OUTCRY is the project of THE JUSTICE FOUNDATION to end legal 
abortion by exposing the truth about its devastating impact on women and families.”  Operation Out-
cry, http://www.operationoutcry.org/pages.asp?pageid=27784 (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).  The Justice 
Foundation provides pro bono help to litigate a variety of conservative issues, including “enforcing 
laws to protect women’s health.”  The Justice Foundation, http://www.thejusticefoundation.org (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
 145. SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, MINUTES OF THIRD MEETING 3 (Oct. 
20–21, 2005), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/interim/2005/minutes/MABO1020.pdf (reporting that 
Linda Schlueter, Vice President and Senior Staff Attorney, The Justice Foundation, San Antonio, 
Texas, distributed written copies of her testimony and entered into the record affidavits of approxi-
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dence in other state legislatures including Ohio146 and Mississippi,147 as 
well as in the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act case.148  The South 
Dakota Task Force cited to a significant number of empirical studies that 
were authored by David Reardon and his collaborators149 to demonstrate 
the psychological and physical injuries that abortion inflicts on women.  
Both Reardon and Cassidy have been involved in enacting and defending 
informed consent legislation in South Dakota.150  (Reardon spoke at a 
 
mately 1500 women who have had negative experiences with their abortions).  For testimony, see Op-
eration Outcry, Linda Schlueter’s Testimony to S. Dakota Task Force, Oct. 20, 2005, http://www. 
operationoutcry.org/pages.asp?pageid=29830 (citing David Reardon as authority). 
 146. See Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Ohio Abortion Ban Gets Hearing, http://www.cbrinfo. 
org/CBRMidwest/0706.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2007); Marley Greiner, God’s Politics at the State-
house: Ohio Abortion Hearing Goes to Sunday School, COLUMBUS FREE PRESS, July 2, 2006, 
http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/18/2006/2070. 
 147. “Because of the scientific evidence we now have, because of testimony upon testimony of 
women about how abortion hurt them, because we now know it is not good for women and it really 
isn’t a choice, abortion should no longer be legal.”  Operation Outcry, Prepared Testimony of Lisa 
Dudley Before the Legislature of Mississippi (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.operationoutcry.org/ 
pages.asp?pageid=37528; Operation Outcry, Prepared Testimony of Tracy Reynolds Before the Legis-
lature of Mississippi (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.operationoutcry.org/pages.asp?pageid=37529. 
 148. See supra note 142. 
 149. In the section on psychological harm, Reardon authored or coauthored five of the approxi-
mately twenty-five studies cited; his collaborator Priscilla Coleman authored twelve.  See TASK FORCE 
REPORT, supra note 75, at 43–45.  In the section on physical harm, Reardon authored one of the four 
studies cited.  The other three were authored by Gissler.  Id. at 50. 
The Task Force received written testimony from Reardon as well.  SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE 
TO STUDY ABORTION, MINUTES OF SECOND MEETING 4 (Sept. 21–22, 2005), available at http://legis. 
state.sd.us/interim/2005/minutes/MABO0921.pdf (reporting written testimony from Dr. David C. 
Reardon, of the Elliot Institute, on “psychological matters related to abortion and the affects [sic] on 
the mother”). 
 150. As an “associate counsel” of the Thomas More Law Center, Harold Cassidy played a role in 
the near-successful effort to enact an abortion ban in South Dakota in 2004.  For some accounts of his 
efforts, see Joe Kafka, Abortion Bill Sent to House Floor, ABERDEEN NEWS (Aberdeen, S.D.), Feb. 6, 
2004, available at http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irvi/irvi_26southdakotaabrbill.html; John Brannian, 
Letter to Editor, Futile Legislation, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.), Feb. 23, 2004, at 5B; South 
Dakota House Passes Bill Criminalizing Abortions; Challenge to Roe v. Wade, Feb. 11, 2004, 
http://www.thomasmore.org/show_news.html?NewsID=172.  In 2005, Cassidy testified for the bills that 
amended the state’s informed consent law and created the Task Force.  See South Dakota Legislature, 
Senate State Affairs Minutes (Feb. 23, 2005), http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2005/cmminute/ 
minSST02230745.htm.  He then represented a CPC that intervened in litigation concerning the state’s 
informed consent statute.  Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, No. Civ. 05-4077 KES, 2005 WL 
2338863 (D.S.D. Sept. 23, 2005); see supra note 137 (describing law and litigation). 
Reardon’s proposed informed consent statute would have increased the standard of care for abor-
tion providers and required them to treat patients in accordance with postabortion syndrome risk fac-
tors; it was enforceable through a private right of action.  The bill was introduced in the legislature on 
January 24, the day that 1215, the bill to ban abortions, was introduced by the same legislator, Roger 
Hunt, but 1216 was tabled in favor of the ban statute.  See SOUTH DAKOTA BILL HISTORY REPORT 73 
(2006), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2006/billstatus.pdf (reporting history of House Bill 
1216, “An Act to define the applicable standard of care in regard to screening of risk factors for all 
abortions except in the case of a medical emergency, to provide civil remedies, and to exempt medical 
emergencies from the requirements of this Act”).  Reardon was one of several witnesses testifying on 
behalf of House Bill 1216.  See South Dakota Legislature, House Judiciary Minutes (Feb. 6, 2006), 
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2006/cmminute/minHJU02060715.htm; Audio file: Testimony of David 
C. Reardon before S.D. Judiciary Committee on H.B. 1216 (Feb. 6, 2000), available at http://legis.state. 
sd.us/sessions/2006/1216.htm (follow audio hyperlink associated with “Judiciary Do Pass Failed”) (au-
dio broadcast with Reardon testifying at approximately twenty-three minutes that thirty to sixty per-
cent of women who have abortions report that they are pressured to do so, and suggesting that “when 
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public event with South Dakota legislators held on Roe’s anniversary two 
days before an informed consent bill and the bill banning abortion were 
introduced into the legislature.)151  An antiabortion Web site is now post-
ing documents attributed to David Reardon that propose revisions to 
South Dakota’s ban statute and other model legislation designed to ap-
peal to Justice Kennedy.152 
Just as the national movement contributed the core arguments and 
evidence of the South Dakota Task Force Report, the Report is now shap-
ing legislative developments in other states.  Months after the ban’s en-
actment, a witness presented the South Dakota Report in a hearing of the 
Louisiana state legislature, and directly quoted, without attribution, sig-
nificant passages of the Report in her own testimony.153  After hearing 
postabortion syndrome testimony, the Louisiana legislature enacted a 
 
a woman violates her maternal desires, her moral beliefs and has an abortion,” she will be at high risk 
for psychological injury). 
 151. See Press Conference to Discuss Legislation and New Polling Data on Abortion and Sex Edu-
cation in South Dakota, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 20. 2006 (announcing a special question and answer ses-
sion featuring “Dr. David Reardon, nationally recognized researcher, South Dakota Legislators, and 
Parents” at Holiday Inn, with a sponsoring contact at the National Abstinence Clearinghouse, to be 
held on Roe’s anniversary two days before introduction of the bill banning abortion).  Additionally, 
Reardon testified in support of the South Dakota right-to-know statute.  See supra note 150. 
 152. An antiabortion blog has posted model legislation and possible amendments to the South 
Dakota ban designed to make it more palatable to Justice Kennedy.  The proposals are attributed to 
David Reardon and the Elliot Institute: 
In light of the possibility that a number of states may follow the lead of South Dakota and 
Louisiana by enacting heightened abortion restrictions, up to and including some form of com-
prehensive prohibition or ban, the Elliott Institute has developed a number of possible variations 
to the South Dakota statute, as well as a separate model “Women’s Health Protection Act” (with 
a related “Talking Points” Introduction) which sets forth screening requirements for certain risk 
factors before an abortion may be performed, enforceable through civil remedies. 
David Reardon, Director of the Institute, asked that we make these materials available in 
order to encourage consideration of alternative approaches, with the hope that presenting alter-
native issues for the Supreme Court’s consideration would increase the possibility [sic] of a favor-
able result. 
The entry is posted by Carl Lundblad on June 11, 2006, on behalf of “The Law of Life Project [which] 
is a legal and legislative advocacy and public education project of the Christian Legal Society’s Center 
for Law and Religious Freedom that desires to advance a culture of life from conception to natural 
death.”  Law of Life Project, http://www.lawoflifeproject.com/blog/2006/06/alternative_proposals_for_ 
stat.html (June 11, 2006, 10:18 PM). 
 153. A document identified as Dr. McKissic Bush’s testimony to the Louisiana state legislature 
recounts: 
In my medical clinical experience, shared by the clinical experience with many other physi-
cians with whom I have consulted, it is simply unrealistic to expect that a pregnant mother is ca-
pable of being involved in the termination of the life of her own child without substantial risk of 
suffering significant psychological trauma and distress.  To do so is beyond the normal, natural 
and health [sic] capability of a woman whose natural instincts are to protect and nurture her child. 
Prepared Testimony of Dr. Freda McKissic Bush, M.D.: Hearing on S.B. 33 Before the H. Admin. of 
Criminal Justice Comm., 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. 6–7 (La. 2006), available at http://www.lawoflifeproject. 
com/blog/Documents/Prepared%20Testimony%20of%20Freda%20McKissic%20Bush%2C%20MD.
pdf.  Compare the quoted testimony to this passage from the Task Force Report: 
The Task Force finds that it is simply unrealistic to expect that a pregnant mother is capable 
of being involved in the termination of the life of her own child without risk of suffering signifi-
cant psychological trauma and distress.  To do so is beyond the normal, natural, and healthy ca-
pability of a woman whose natural instincts are to protect and nurture her child. 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 47–48.  There are many other similar passages and turns of 
phrase in the two documents. 
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“trigger ban,” set to go into effect if Roe is overruled.154  Legislators in 
other states have cited South Dakota as a model, with Alabama State 
Senator Hank Erwin, who sponsored a bill criminalizing abortion re-
marking, “I thought if South Dakota can do it, Alabama ought to do 
it.”155 
III. SOUTH DAKOTA’S ABORTION BAN IS BASED ON 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL GENDER STEREOTYPES 
In the years since Roe, abortion regulation has been constitutionally 
analyzed as if its sole purpose were to protect potential life and it 
scarcely concerned women at all.  I have elsewhere argued that this 
framework is fundamentally mistaken; all efforts to restrict abortion aim 
to regulate women as well as the unborn.156  The deficiencies of the pre-
vailing approach are glaringly obvious once the state argues that it is 
regulating abortion for the purpose of protecting women. 
Why is it constitutionally significant that the state seeks to regulate 
abortion in order to protect women as well as the unborn?  Why would 
providing an additional justification for an abortion ban weaken its claim 
to constitutionality? 
As we have seen, David Reardon and others first proposed woman-
protective justifications for banning abortion in the 1980s and 1990s 
when the movement encountered difficulties in persuading governing 
majorities of voters to support legal restrictions on abortion using famil-
iar fetal-focused arguments.  Abortion bans based on fetal-focused ar-
guments implicitly or explicitly value women’s freedom and well-being in 
ways that made many voters uneasy.  However clearly these swing voters 
understood the case for protecting the unborn, they also understood the 
many reasons a pregnant woman might resist becoming a mother and 
 
 154. Dorinda C. Bordlee & Nikolas T. Nikas, Eroding Roe: Get on the PRA Bandwagon, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE, June 19, 2006, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZDM3OGUzNTE5OWU5N2Q4 
NTJlYzgwYzE4OTdhYmJkZmI=&c=1.  The National Review reported that: 
Led by women with the courage to share their stories of profound grief and medical trauma 
that they suffered after they chose the “choice,” Louisiana has passed legislation to outlaw the 
human-rights violation known as abortion on demand. . . . 
The tears in the eyes of the I-thought-I’d-seen-it-all legislators best told the story.  In the 
house and senate committee hearings, woman after woman shared their experience of how abor-
tion had led them into a downward spiral of medical and psychological distress that had even im-
pacted their ability to bond with their future children.  The faces of the committee members hear-
ing the post-abortion testimony revealed profound empathy and pain that was likely, in many 
cases, related to how abortion had negatively impacted their own lives. 
. . . . 
The bottom line is that PRA legislation is both prudent and proactive.  It is pro-woman and 
pro-life. 
Id. 
 155. Rich Ehisen, States Lining Up to Copy South Dakota Ban, ST. NET CAPITOL J., Mar. 13, 
2006, http://www.statenet.com/capitol_journal/03-13-2006; Gudrun Schultz, Alabama Legislators Push 
for Law to Ban Abortion, LIFESITENEWS.COM, Mar. 27, 2006, http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2006/mar/ 
06032704.html. 
 156. See Siegel, supra note 29. 
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were unwilling for the state to impose motherhood in these circum-
stances.  David Reardon described these voters as “the middle major-
ity—the ‘fence sitting’ fifty percent or more who feel torn between both 
the woman and the child.”157  Frederica Mathewes-Green of Feminists 
for Life suggests that within the antiabortion movement these voters 
were commonly referred to as the “mushy middle.”158 
Woman-protective antiabortion argument seeks to allay voter 
anxieties about coercing women with assurances that in prohibiting abor-
tion the state is in fact protecting women against misrepresentation, co-
ercion, and harm in the abortion decision.  But if these additional justifi-
cations for prohibiting abortion in fact work to reassure voters, they do 
so because they offer the public reasons for regulating women’s decisions 
about motherhood.  No longer is the invitation to intervene in women’s 
decisions about whether to become a mother implicit, an incident of an 
effort to protect the unborn.  Gender-based justifications for restricting 
abortion make oversight of women’s decision making about motherhood 
an express purpose of abortion regulation, offering benign, paternalist 
justifications for controlling women’s decisions.  One branch of these 
gender-based justifications for regulating abortion is process oriented 
and is expressed in the language of informed consent (i.e., abortion is not 
a genuine choice), and the other is outcome oriented and is expressed in 
the language of public health (i.e., abortion is a bad choice).  As the legis-
lative history of the South Dakota ban illustrates, these justifications are 
often based, implicitly or explicitly, on stereotypical reasoning about 
women’s agency and women’s roles. 
The remainder of this Part analyzes these justifications more 
closely, demonstrating that gender stereotyping supplies much of their 
persuasive force.  Arguments for restricting abortion that persuade by 
appeal to gender stereotypes are politically effective because they allay 
public concerns about coercing women, but are unconstitutional for pre-
cisely this reason. 
A. Stereotypes About Women’s Capacity 
The Report of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion seeks 
the elimination of abortion by the most effective means in the current le-
 
 157. See Reardon, supra note 116, at 32. 
 158. See Mathewes-Green, supra note 124.  Frederica Mathewes-Green, longtime member of 
Feminists for Life, recalled that: 
Pro-life leaders noticed that the primary message of the previous couple of decades, our in-
sistence on the unborn child’s full humanity and right to life, was no longer gaining ground.  We 
had honed this message and it was ubiquitous and consistent, and we personally found it unassail-
able.  Yet we were increasingly encountering people capable of dismissing it.  Perhaps all the 
people susceptible to it had already been reached and converted.  For the remainder, whom we 
termed “the mushy middle,” it was falling on deaf ears. 
Id. 
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gal and political climate.159  The Report offers seventy-one pages of find-
ings in support of an abortion ban or additional informed consent regula-
tion.160  As we have seen, these findings draw on the arguments and evi-
dence of the national antiabortion movement, which has employed the 
language of informed consent in the last several decades to justify incre-
mental restrictions on abortion not only to defend constitutionally per-
missible forms of regulation, but also to generate political support for 
such regulation by use of the politically potent discourse of “choice” long 
used by supporters of the abortion right.161 
The South Dakota Task Force Report expresses its opposition to 
abortion in this incrementalist, informed consent paradigm.  For this rea-
son, the Task Force Report appears to address women as self-governing 
agents who are capable of making their own decisions about whether to 
continue a pregnancy.  But the Report does not in fact view women in 
this way, nor does it encourage the public to do so.  I first show the spe-
cialized usage of informed consent discourse in the antiabortion argu-
ment of the Task Force Report, and then demonstrate how it persuades 
by appealing to gender stereotypes. 
Though it asserts that it is interested in protecting women’s freedom 
to make decisions about abortions, the Task Force is in fact more 
interested in preventing women from having abortions.162  The Task 
Force Report expresses its moral judgments about abortion in the lan-
guage of informed consent, describing decisions against abortion as “in-
formed” and depicting decisions to have abortion as mistaken or co-
erced.  When the Report advocates laws that encourage more “informed” 
abortion decisions, it is calling for laws that limit abortion: 
We find it untenable that the law allows a mother to be implicated in 
the termination of the life of her own child.  Since the abortion pro-
viders repress information necessary for a full disclosure of this cir-
cumstance, there is a clear need for additional protections of the 
mother, not just to assist in helping make that decision better in-
formed, but to prevent her short- and long-term suffering.163 
The Report repeatedly expresses concern about protecting women 
from misinformation and pressure that might lead them to abort a preg-
nancy, while expressing no concern about protecting women from misin-
formation and pressure that might lead them to continue a pregnancy.  
 
 159. The Report acknowledges the difficulties of enforcing a ban so long as Roe is law, and ob-
serves that “while we recommend, and even urge, a legal ban on abortion, we nonetheless propose the 
following additional legislation in an effort to lessen the loss of life and harm caused by abortion until 
such a ban can be implemented.”  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 69.  The Report then pro-
poses various forms of informed consent regulation, concluding its list by proposing “[a]ny other legis-
lation that has as its goal to decrease the number of abortions in our State.”  Id. at 69–71. 
 160. See generally id. 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 130–40. 
 162. Cf. supra note 159 (discussing the Task Force’s support for a ban and its recommendation 
that the legislature adopt any legislation that would decrease the number of abortions in the state). 
 163. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 65–66 (emphasis added). 
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The Report is not interested in supporting women’s decisions to postpone 
or avoid motherhood, and it does not acknowledge the possibility that a 
“normal” woman could make a free and informed decision to end a 
pregnancy.  Instead the Report presents abortion as a bad decision, but in 
terms that systemically exonerate women of responsibility for deciding to 
have abortions.  The plausibility of the Report’s claims about capacity, 
coercion, and responsibility depends on stereotypes about woman as de-
cision makers. 
To attack abortion without criticizing women and to allay public 
concern about abortion regulation that coerces women, the Task Force 
repeatedly discounts women’s agency in abortion.  The Report suggests 
that women lack the judgment and independence necessary to make a 
responsible decision about abortion, and hence need protection: 
The testimony of the nearly two thousand women who had abor-
tions is replete with references to how they were left to fend for 
themselves and allowed to make decisions based upon false as-
sumptions of biological fact.  The abortion providers wanted the 
women to make decisions about those biological facts themselves 
even though they had no expertise.164 
The Report far more commonly speaks of women “submitting to abor-
tion” than “choosing” to have an abortion.  “It appears that at Planned 
Parenthood, where women are not informed of information about the 
child, virtually every woman submits to an abortion.”165  “The only time 
the abortion doctor sees the patient is in the room where the procedure 
is to be performed, after the woman has already committed to submitting 
to the abortion by signing the consent form.”166  “In the overwhelming 
majority of cases, the decision to submit to an abortion is uninformed.  
Further, there are many pressures and coercive forces and elements, in-
cluding some that are hidden and inherent in the nature of the proce-
dure, that render most abortions not truly voluntary.”167 
The picture of women as decision makers in the Report resembles 
the picture of women as decision makers in the legislative findings that 
support the right-to-know law South Dakota enacted at the same time 
the Task Force was created, which emphasize that “a woman seeking to 
terminate the life of her unborn child may be subject to pressures which 
can cause an emotional crisis, undue reliance on the advice of others, 
clouded judgment, and a willingness to violate conscience to avoid those 
pressures.”168  This portrait of the pregnant woman bears a certain re-
 
 164. Id. at 39. 
 165. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
 166. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. at 37 (emphasis added). 
 168. H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005) (cited in S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1.4 
(2006)). 
The Legislature finds that procedures terminating the life of an unborn child impose risks to 
the life and health of the pregnant woman.  The Legislature further finds that a woman seeking to 
terminate the life of her unborn child may be subject to pressures which can cause an emotional 
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semblance to the woman hysteric who figures prominently in nineteenth-
century antiabortion tracts.169  Some individual men and women may 
make decisions in an agitated mental state, and targeted support and 
safeguards for them may be needed, but to regulate on the presupposi-
tion that agents are generally in this condition is to presume decision 
makers incapable of acting sui juris, hence requiring paternalistic over-
sight. 
Just as the Legislature reasoned that pregnant women are generally 
confused, emotional, dependent, and unable to act in a principled fash-
ion, so, too, did the Task Force.  It presented the testimonies submitted 
by Operation Outcry as a fair representation of how women make deci-
sions about abortion: 
We received and reviewed the testimony of more than 1,940 women 
who have had abortions. . . . Women were not told the truth about 
abortion, were misled into thinking that nothing but “tissue” was 
being removed, and relate that they would not have had an abortion 
if they were told the truth.  They relate that they were coerced into 
having the abortion by the father of the child or a parent, and that 
the abortion clinics also apply pressure to have the abortion.  They 
almost uniformly express anger toward the abortion providers, their 
 
crisis, undue reliance on the advice of others, clouded judgment, and a willingness to violate con-
science to avoid those pressures.  The Legislature therefore finds that great care should be taken 
to provide a woman seeking to terminate the life of her unborn child and her own constitutionally 
protected interest in her relationship with her child with complete and accurate information and 
adequate time to understand and consider that information in order to make a fully informed and 
voluntary consent to the termination of either or both. 
Id. 
 169. A popular antiabortion tract authored by the leader of the nineteenth-century criminaliza-
tion campaign derided women’s capacity to make decisions about abortion,  suggesting that pregnant 
women were especially prone to hysteria: 
If each woman were allowed to judge for herself in this matter, her decision upon the ab-
stract question would be too sure to be warped by personal considerations, and those of the mo-
ment.  Woman’s mind is prone to depression, and, indeed, to temporary actual derangement, un-
der the stimulus of uterine excitation, and this alike at the time of puberty and the final cessation 
of the menses, at the monthly period and at conception, during pregnancy, at labor, and during 
lactation . . . . 
Is there then no alternative but for women, when married and prone to conception, to occa-
sionally bear children?  This, as we have seen, is the end for which they are physiologically consti-
tuted and for which they are destined by nature. . . . [The prevention and termination of preg-
nancy] are alike disastrous to a woman’s mental, moral, and physical well-being. 
STORER, supra note 31, at 74–76; cf. E. P. Christian, The Pathological Consequences Incident to In-
duced Abortion, 2 DETROIT REV. MED. & PHARMACY 145, 146 (1867) (citing “the intimate relation 
between the nervous and uterine systems manifested in the various and frequent nervous disorders 
arising from uterine derangements,” i.e., “hysteria,” and “the liability of the female, in all her diseases, 
to intercurrent derangements of these functions” as factors that “might justly lead us to expect that 
violence against the physiological laws of gestation and parturition would entail upon the subject of 
such an unnatural procedure a severe and grievous penalty”).  See generally Siegel, supra note 29, at 
311 n.199 (surveying physiological arguments in nineteenth-century antiabortion literature and observ-
ing that “physiological arguments were used to attack the concept of voluntary motherhood in two 
ways.  In addition to arguing that women’s capacity to bear children rendered them incapable of mak-
ing responsible choices in matters concerning reproduction, Storer (and others) claimed that women 
would injure their health if they practiced abortion or contraception or otherwise willfully resisted 
assuming the role of motherhood.”). 
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baby’s father, or society in general, which promote abortion as a 
great right, the exercise of which is good for women.  They almost 
invariably state that they were encouraged to have an abortion by 
the mere fact that it was legal. . . . The overwhelming majority of 
women testified that they would never have considered an abortion 
if it were not legal.  Their testimony revealed that they feel that the 
legalization of abortion simply gave a license to others to pressure 
them into a decision they otherwise would not have made.170 
Operation Outcry’s affidavits are of a piece with other arguments and 
evidence supplied by the national movement; they employ informed con-
sent as a “pro-woman” frame in which to argue for restrictions on abor-
tion.  The Task Force enthusiastically relied on these affidavits to depict 
women’s experience with abortion, despite obvious questions about the 
testimony’s representativeness and reliability.171 
If the Task Force Report had expressed concern about a group of 
women who were confused or coerced and asked questions about how to 
provide support and protections for such women in a fashion that would 
preserve freedom of choice for the many other women who were capable 
of making their own decisions about abortion, its report would sound 
radically different than the report it presented—in which women are 
generally depicted as confused and coerced decision makers.  The dis-
placement of the argument about the morality of abortion into a set of 
claims about the competence of women as decisional agents taps perni-
ciously (or, depending on one’s standpoint, fortuitously) into longstand-
ing traditions of gender paternalism, increasing the likelihood that law-
makers will make judgments about regulating women’s decision making 
that rest on stereotypical assumptions about women.  Minority members 
of the Task Force complained bitterly that the majority had excluded 
from the Report all the nonconforming testimony about women’s experi-
 
 170. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 21. 
 171. Operation Outcry solicits testimonies through organizations such as state Right to Life chap-
ters, David Reardon’s Elliot Institute, the Republican National Committee Blogger Forum, and Ra-
chel’s Vineyard.  See Hawaii Right to Life, http://www.hrtl.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2007); Press Re-
lease, Elliot Institute, Post-Abortive Women to Overturn Roe v. Wade (May 3, 2001), 
http://www.afterabortion.info/news/OperationOC.html; Kim Priestap, http://kimpriestap.typepad.com/ 
kim_priestap/2006/01/operation_outcr.html (Jan. 10, 2006, 03:34 PM); Rachel’s Vineyard, Judges De-
cide Against Oral Arguments in the Case Against Abortion (Apr. 2004), http://www.rachelsvineyard. 
org/publications/news/news0404.htm#Judge.  There is obvious selection bias in the source of the testi-
monies, and there seems to be witness prompting as well.  Rachel’s Vineyard instructs readers, “Op-
eration Outcry needs not only the accounts of those who were physically injured but especially the 
accounts of those who have experienced emotional trauma, pain, and suffering.”  Id.  On the Opera-
tion Outcry affidavit, a woman may volunteer to tell her story in more detail to an Operation Outcry 
representative over the phone.  Standard questions include: “Were you adequately informed of the 
nature of abortion, what it is, what it does?”; “Were you adequately informed of the consequences of 
abortion?”; “Were you informed of any link between abortion and breast cancer?  Have you had 
breast cancer?”; and “Did anyone pressure you into having an abortion?  If yes, who?”  See Operation 
Outcry, Affidavit, available at http://www.operationoutcry.org/images/64304/AffidavitForm-11-06.doc 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
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ence with abortion that had been presented to it172—including the views 
of the minority members themselves.173  They went on to express their 
objections to the legislative findings supporting the state’s informed con-
sent law as resting on “a sexist, insulting, condescending, and inaccurate 
stereotype of women” that “run[s] directly contrary to the well-
established legal principle of personal responsibility, which has previ-
ously been applied to apply to any citizen regardless of gender.”174 
Because the Task Force Report argues its case against abortion by 
presenting women as victims of misrepresentation and coercion who 
need regulation to protect them from access to abortion, it grounds its 
case against abortion in a picture of women as lacking sufficient knowl-
edge, capacity for cognitive and moral judgment, and independence of 
will to be entrusted with responsibility for making decisions about the fu-
ture course of their lives.  But one need not consult the legislative history 
of the abortion ban for evidence of its paternalism.  The abortion ban 
announces that its purpose is to protect women,175 which it does by re-
stricting women’s choices, while excusing their conduct.  South Dakota’s 
law imposes criminal sanctions on those who help a pregnant woman 
abort a pregnancy, while exempting the woman who seeks an abortion 
from criminal liability for her actions: “Nothing in this Act may be con-
strued to subject the pregnant mother upon whom any abortion is per-
formed or attempted to any criminal conviction and penalty.”176 
 
 172. See SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, REPORT OF MINORITY 21 (2006), 
available at http://www.argusleader.com/assets/pdf/DF34116714.PDF [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT] 
(reproducing Reproductive Health Decision Makers, Motion Submitted for the Record (Dec. 9, 2005)).  
Citing the statements of seven doctors who testified before the Task Force, the Minority Report found 
that “every pregnancy is unique and the outcome is always uncertain.  When faced with unintended 
pregnancy, women make informed and voluntary decisions.”  Id. 
 173. The majority refused to include the views of the minority in the Task Force Report, and so 
the minority separately published their views.  See id. at 2 (reproducing letter from South Dakota Task 
Force to Study Abortion to Governor M. Michael Rounds and members of the South Dakota Legisla-
ture (Jan. 13, 2006)). 
 174. See id. at 26–27 (reproducing Informed Consent, Unintended Consequences, Motion Submit-
ted for the Record (Dec. 9, 2005)): 
The Task Force finds that the legislative findings supporting South Dakota 34-23A-10.1 run 
directly contrary to the well-established legal principle of personal responsibility, which has pre-
viously been applied to apply to any citizen regardless of gender. 
The Task Force finds that the legislative findings supporting South Dakota 34-23A-10.1, 
specifically that “a woman seeking to terminate the life of her unborn child may be subject to 
pressures which can cause an emotional crisis, undue reliance on the advice of others, clouded 
judgment, and a willingness to violate conscience to avoid those pressures,” are a sexist, insulting, 
condescending, and inaccurate stereotype of women. 
The Task Force finds that South Dakota 34-23A-10.1 offers a mitigation of personal respon-
sibility for pregnant women and girls which may apply in a broader context than just health care 
decision making and could and possibly provide a defense for criminal, civil and contractual li-
ability for such persons. 
The Task Force finds that the legislative findings supporting South Dakota 34-23A-10.1 may 
offer grounds to justify employment discrimination against pregnant women and girls.  Therefore, 
the Task Force recommends that the Attorney General of the State of South Dakota cease in the 
defense of South Dakota 34-23A-10.1 in Federal District Court. 
Id. 
 175. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 176. See supra note 70 (quoting statute). 
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Woman-protectionist arguments for regulating abortion draw per-
suasive force from familiar stereotypes about women’s agency.  The 
common law of coverture long excused women from responsibility while 
limiting their autonomy.  In depicting women as lacking capacity to make 
independent decisions and justifying restrictions on women’s choices as 
necessary to protect their welfare, the Report perpetuates these ancient 
traditions of gender paternalism.177  But the Report also implicitly, and at 
times explicitly, draws upon another stream of stereotypes concerning 
women’s roles.  South Dakota treats women as impaired in their capacity 
to make life plans to the extent that their life decisions deviate from role 
expectations concerning women’s obligations as mothers. 
B. Stereotypes About Women’s Roles 
South Dakota was quite frank in acknowledging that the purpose of 
its ban on abortions was not only to protect the unborn, but to regulate 
women’s conduct as mothers: 
 
 177. Anne Coughlin has examined gendered standards of responsibility in the criminal law.  She 
traces excuses that presume women’s coercion to marriage: 
The presumption of coercion is startling for its complete reversal of the normal assumptions 
underlying the criminal law’s inquiry into an accused person’s responsibility for a crime.  In cases 
where a (potentially) responsible actor is involved, the law starts from the assumption that the ac-
cused is a fit subject for punishment because he made a rational decision to commit a crime.  The 
law then goes on to entertain only the most compelling evidence that the accused’s cognitive and 
volitional capacities and opportunities were so deficient that he should not be blamed.  By con-
trast, when a married woman came before the criminal court, the law started from the assumption 
that she had an inevitably malleable nature, and it attributed her crime, not to her own exercise of 
will, but to the influence exerted by her husband’s will.  The law only considered evidence sug-
gesting that the woman should be punished if she acted “independently” of the man.  In the eyes 
of the criminal law, then, the model female actor was the polar opposite of the model responsible 
actor. 
It would be foolhardy to purport to draw firm conclusions about cultural and political as-
sumptions underlying a rule of law that endured for at least twelve centuries. . . . Although the 
tenor of the judges’ comments about the doctrine changed over time, virtually all of their reasons 
referred to, and endorsed, the unequal positions occupied by the individual parties to a marriage 
and the hierarchical structure of the marital entity itself.  These references portray the judges’ 
recognition that marriage was the dominant social institution in women’s lives and that the hus-
band, and not any processes of the criminal law, had been assigned the leading role in controlling 
women’s misconduct. 
Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 32–34 (1994).  The law of coverture viewed 
married women as lacking competence to act sui juris; restrictions on women’s agency were justified 
on the grounds that women were vulnerable to marital coercion, and so required a husband’s supervi-
sion and representation.  To see these understandings expressed as arguments against women voting, 
see Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 993–97 (2002).  Justice Bradley famously expressed this paternalist 
vision of marriage when he explained why the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect women’s right 
to practice law in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.  The natural and proper timidity and delicacy 
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”). 
Frontiero v. Richardson repudiated this vision of women’s roles in a plurality opinion that recog-
nized that the nation’s “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” was “[t]raditionally . . . 
rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a 
pedestal, but in a cage.”  411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
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The Legislature finds, based upon the conclusions of the South Da-
kota Task Force to Study Abortion, and in recognition of the tech-
nological advances and medical experience and body of knowledge 
about abortions produced and made available since the 1973 deci-
sion of Roe v. Wade, that to fully protect the rights, interests, and  
health of the pregnant mother, the rights, interest, and life of her 
unborn child, and the mother’s fundamental natural intrinsic right 
to a relationship with her child, abortions in South Dakota should 
be prohibited.178 
Assumptions concerning women’s role as mothers ground South Da-
kota’s claims about informed consent.  The Task Force Report argues: 
It is so far outside the normal conduct of a mother to implicate her-
self in the killing of her own child.  Either the abortion provider 
must deceive the mother into thinking the unborn child does not yet 
exist, and thereby induce her consent without being informed, or 
the abortion provider must encourage her to defy her very nature as 
a mother to protect her child.  Either way, this method of waiver 
denigrates her rights to reach a decision for herself.179 
Beliefs about women’s roles also ground the Report’s claims about 
women’s health: 
The task force finds that it is simply unrealistic to expect that a 
pregnant mother is capable of being involved in the termination of 
the life of her own child without risk of suffering significant psycho-
logical trauma and distress.  To do so is beyond the normal, natural, 
and healthy capability of a woman whose natural instincts are to 
protect and nurture her child.180 
In expressing claims about women’s nature and claims about women’s 
roles as claims about women’s health, South Dakota is advancing 
woman-protective justifications for restricting abortion of the kind em-
ployed in the nineteenth-century criminalization campaign.181 
 
 178. H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006). 
 179. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 56. 
 180. Id. at 47–48. 
 181. For an illustration, see supra Part II.A.  A popular antiabortion tract authored by Horatio 
Storer, the leader of the criminalization campaign, argued: 
Every married woman, save in very exceptional cases, which should only be allowed to be such by 
the decision of a competent physician, every married woman, until near the so-called turn of life, 
should occasionally bear a child; not as a duty to the community merely . . . but as the best means 
of insuring her own permanent good health.  How frequently should this be?  Usually the interval 
should be from two to two and a half or three years, so as to allow a sufficient time for nursing, so 
important for the welfare of the child and its mother, and an interval of subsequent rest. 
STORER, supra note 35, at 115–16.  Similarly, Edwin Hale characterized contraception as an “of-
fence . . . against physiology, because it prevents the occurrence of pregnancy, which is a normal 
physiological condition, and often absolutely necessary to the physical and moral health of woman.”  
HALE, supra note 34, at 6 n.  He makes the same argument against abortion.  Id. at 5.  “It is . . . women 
who do not pretend to guide the course of events, or make the laws of nature conform to their wishes, 
who are in health,” Augustus Gardner warned, “while the wise in their own conceit are sufferers, inva-
lids, and useless.”  Gardner, supra note 36, at 230.  Edwin Hale further condemned the wife who seeks 
an abortion for “Love of Fashionable Life,” warning “[s]terility comes to punish her for the heinous 
crime of which she has been guilty. . . . [A]bortion brings sickness and perhaps death, or numerous 
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These sex-role-based claims about women’s health are now com-
mon in the modern antiabortion movement.  The Web site of the Na-
tional Right to Life Committee182 posts the 1989 congressional testimony 
of its president Wanda Franz: “When they are reminded of the abor-
tion . . . the women re-experienced it with terrible psychological pain . . . . 
They feel worthless and victimized because they failed at the most natu-
ral of human activities—the role of being a mother.”183  The Web site of 
the Family Research Council asserts: “When certain practices violate 
human dignity and the intrinsic nature of womanhood and motherhood, 
they produce psychological problems based on the denial of the truth 
about the human person. . . . The natural inclination of a mother is to 
embrace the new life within her, and to protect and nurture all of her 
children . . . .”184 
Even when the gender-based argument against abortion does not 
employ explicit claims about women’s “nature,” it continues to reason 
from stereotypes about women’s roles.  The most common of these is the 
assertion that prohibiting abortion protects both women and children be-
cause the rights, needs, and interests of women and children do not con-
flict.  The argument addresses women as caregivers whose interests are 
perfectly realized in protecting and providing for their children.185  As 
David Reardon explained: 
If there is a single principle, then, which lies at the heart of the pro-
woman/pro-life agenda, it would have to be this: the best interests of 
the child and the mother are always joined.  This is true even if the 
mother does not initially realize it, and even if she needs a tremen-
dous amount of love and help to see it.186 
The Task Force Report expresses this argument as a finding of fact: 
We find that the unborn child possesses intrinsic rights that are in 
perfect harmony with and equal to the intrinsic rights of that child’s 
mother . . . . These cherished rights are compatible and harmonious, 
 
other evils in its train, besides remorse, which will come sooner or later.”  HALE, supra note 34, at 10; 
see also id. at 9 (“In natural, healthy parturition, there is little or no actual pain. . . . Abortion, on the 
contrary, is always attended by a great amount of immediate or remote suffering.”). 
One commentator associated abortion, infanticide, masturbation, and contraception with the 
women’s rights movement, and characterized all five as impulses that would result in sterility.  See 3 
ARTHUR W. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 
THE PRESENT 245 (1919); cf. Margarete J. Sandelowski, Failures of Volition: Female Agency and Infer-
tility in Historical Perspective, 15 SIGNS 475, 480–86 (1990) (noting that physicians of the era advance 
the idea that female volition is an explanation of sterility). 
 182. See Path to Peace Found., The Servitor Pacis Award Recipients: 2000—Wanda Franz, 
http://www.thepathtopeacefoundation.org/servitor_franz.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
 183. National Right to Life Committee, supra note 114. 
 184. Gladys A. Sweeney, The Psychological Effects: Practices Opposed to the Culture of Life and 
to Women’s Health, AT THE PODIUM, July 10, 2002, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=PD02G5. 
 185. REARDON, supra note 115, at 5 (“[F]rom a natural law perspective, we can know in advance 
that abortion is inherently harmful to women.  It is simply impossible to rip a child from the womb of a 
mother without tearing out a part of the woman herself—a part of her heart, a part of her joy, a part of 
her maternity.”). 
 186. Id. 
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regardless of the unfortunate circumstances that sadly invoke 
thoughts that she may not be able to avail herself of her great 
rights.187 
Like Reardon, the Task Force Report defines women as mothers—as 
caregivers whose rights and interests are realized in caring for their chil-
dren: “[Abortion] exploits the mother, destroys her rights, destroys her 
interests, and damages her health, and does so by killing her child. . . . It 
kills an innocent human being and in the process creates the illusion that 
a mother and her child—who in reality have interests in harmony with 
each other—are somehow enemies.”188 
The Task Force Report’s arguments about informed consent, its ar-
guments about health, and its arguments about rights and interests in-
voke assumptions about normal mothers and normal women—not nor-
mal fathers or normal parents.  The Task Force appeals to commonsense 
understandings about women’s desires, women’s needs, and women’s 
roles while making almost no mention of men’s desires, needs, or roles.  
The Web site of Concerned Women for America makes the sex-role ba-
sis of the movement’s claims explicit: “Just as abortion demands that 
women violate their natural inclination to nurture, it forces men to reject 
their role as provider and protector.”189  The Task Force Report is written 
from this same standpoint; its concluding recommendations suggest that 
the South Dakota Legislature should “[s]trengthen the child support 
laws, including the requirement that the father of an unborn child sup-
port the mother and their unborn child during the pregnancy and there-
after.”190  But apart from this endorsement of a man’s obligation to sup-
port the mother of his children, the Task Force Report scarcely ever 
mentions men as parents, except in the role of abortion-coercer.  Unlike 
the Concerned Women for America Web site, the Report does not fea-
ture comparative statements about the parental roles of men and women.  
Instead, the Report repeatedly talks about women, women’s nature, and 
women’s roles, inviting the public to draw inferences about the ways 
women act, or can reasonably be expected to act, as parents.  The Re-
port’s explicit claims about women are based on the implicit premise that 
women and men differ, not simply in biological sex roles, but in life aims: 
women’s rights and interests are coextensive with their role in caring for 
children—by implication, men’s are not. 
The Task Force Report grounds this claim of difference in reproduc-
tive physiology.  To explain why there is no conflict of interests between 
women and the children they bear and why a mother lives for her chil-
dren (in a way that men do not), the Report draws on the work of Vin-
 
 187. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 67. 
 188. Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
 189. Concerned Women for America, Abortion’s Impact on Society (Jan. 18, 2003), http://www. 
cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=3109&department=CWA&categoryid=life. 
 190. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 70. 
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cent Rue (who first proposed postabortion syndrome in the early 1980s).  
A woman’s identification with her children is a process that “begins al-
most immediately after conception” and “helps the mother transfer her 
interest from herself to her child, and to prepare herself for her unique 
role in the child’s life.”191  This picture of the mother-child relationship is 
at the heart of the Task Force Report’s antiabortion vision.  When the 
Report argues the state should prohibit abortion in order to protect hu-
man life and to preserve the mother-child relationship, the one attribute 
of the mother-child relationship it singles out for celebration is its “unsel-
fish nature.”192  South Dakota’s ban on abortion not only claims to pro-
tect women and the unborn, but also preserves a certain vision of the 
mother-child relationship.193 
C. Why an Abortion Ban That Rests on Gender-Based Justifications and 
Gender Stereotypes Violates Equal Protection 
South Dakota enacted a law that proscribes abortion in nearly all 
circumstances.  The state required a woman to carry a pregnancy to term 
even if: (a) the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest; (b) she believes, 
or her doctor believes, that carrying the pregnancy to term will physically 
harm her; (c) the father of the child has abandoned her or will do so if 
she gives birth; (d) the father has abused or battered her; (e) bearing and 
rearing the child will cost her education or job; (f) she has no means to 
support the child; (g) after giving birth to another child, whether healthy 
or disabled, she will be unable to provide for the material or emotional 
 
 191. Id. at 54.  Drawing on the work of Vincent Rue and coauthors, the Task Force found that 
[T]he attachment between mother and child begins almost immediately after conception and the 
basis of maternal attachment is both psychological and physical, and this process, and the natural 
protective urges of maternal attachment, often form irrespective of whether the pregnancy was 
intended or wanted. 
This . . . bond helps the mother to transfer her interest from herself to her child, and to pre-
pare her for her unique role in the child’s life. 
Id. 
 192. Id. at 67.  The Task Force found that: 
If there are any self-evident and universal truths that can act for the human race as a guide 
or light in which social and human justice can be grounded, they are these: that life has intrinsic 
value; that each individual human being is unique and irreplaceable; that the cherished role of a 
mother and her relationship with her child, at every moment of life, has intrinsic worth and 
beauty; that the intrinsic beauty of womanhood is inseparable from the beauty of motherhood; 
and that this relationship, in its unselfish nature, and, in its role in the survival of the human race, 
is the touchstone and core of all civilized society.  This relationship, its beauty, its survival, its 
benefits to the mother and child, and its benefits to the State of South Dakota, and society as a 
whole, all rest in the self-evident truth that a mother is not the owner of her child’s life, she is the 
trustee of it. 
Id. 
 193. See id. at 55 (“The Task Force therefore finds that a mother’s unique relationship with her 
child during pregnancy is one of the most intimate and important relationships, worthy of protection.  
The history and tradition of our nation has recognized this relationship as one that has intrinsic beauty 
and benefit to both the mother and the child, and it is recognized as one of the touchstones, and at the 
core, of all civilized society.”). 
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needs of her other children; and (h) she is ethically and emotionally able 
to abort a pregnancy but not to abandon a child after birth. 
South Dakota did not say that it weighed the interests of women 
and the unborn and chose the unborn over women.  Instead, the Legisla-
ture rejected the view that there is any conflict, and asserted that the 
rights and interests of the pregnant woman and the unborn are “in per-
fect harmony . . . regardless of the unfortunate circumstances that sadly 
invoke [the pregnant woman’s] thoughts that she may not be able to avail 
herself of her great rights.”194 
To quell public compunctions about coercing women to give birth 
who do not wish to become mothers, South Dakota offered gender-based 
justifications for its ban that explicitly or implicitly depend for their per-
suasive force on centuries-old stereotypes about women’s agency and 
women’s roles.  It is through the persuasive force of these ancient stories 
about women that the state could argue that an abortion ban would not 
coerce women, instead it would protect women against coercion; the 
abortion ban would not harm women, instead it would protect women 
against harm.  To drown out the objections of women who experience 
coercion and harm in having motherhood forced upon them by law, the 
state justified the ban with claims about what “normal” women want and 
what it is in women’s “very nature as a mother” to do.195 
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws that ban abortion for 
these reasons.  First, an assertedly benign interest in protecting unborn 
life cannot save an abortion ban from claims of sex discrimination if gov-
ernment recites woman-protective justifications to secure the statute’s 
enactment.  Equal protection cases prohibit government from pursuing a 
discriminatory purpose, not only when a discriminatory purpose is the 
sole purpose for the challenged action, but also when that purpose is a 
“motivating factor” for the challenged action.196 
In this case, there is good reason to believe that woman-protective 
justifications played a crucial role in the ban’s enactment.  Jack Willke, 
David Reardon, and others in the national movement developed the 
woman-protective argument for abortion restrictions for the precise pur-
pose of persuading “the middle majority—the ‘fence sitting’ fifty percent 
or more who feel torn between both the woman and the child.”197  
Whether or not this argument was crucial in persuading South Dakota 
legislators to back the bill, key actors emphasized and embraced the 
woman-protective argument as if it were a central reason for the law’s 
enactment.  The statute recited that it was prohibiting abortion for the 
express purpose of protecting women and the mother-child relation-
 
 194. Id. at 67; see also supra text accompanying note 186 (discussing harmony of interests between 
mother and child). 
 195. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 56. 
 196. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
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ship—and the Task Force Report, which was incorporated by reference 
into the statute, devoted over half its argument to elaborating and docu-
menting these claims.198  Finally, Leslee Unruh, who played a central role 
in enacting the ban and then led the referendum campaign to secure 
voter support for it, attributed the ban’s enactment to woman-protective 
argument, and believed that public support for the ban might even be 
harmed by traditional fetal-focused appeals: “The face of this campaign 
[in South Dakota] has not been dead babies or babies, it’s been the 
women.  I get real angry when people want to come to South Dakota and 
drive around with pictures of dead babies . . . it just infuriates me.”199  
Debate about the South Dakota statute, in the Task Force, the Legisla-
ture, and in the referendum campaign, emphasized protecting women.  
Regulating women’s conduct as mothers was not an incidental purpose, 
but a significant motivating factor in the enactment of the South Dakota 
abortion ban. 
Second, under the Constitution, citizens are free to embrace tradi-
tional gender-differentiated family roles, but government may no longer 
 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 68–78. 
 199. See Reva B. Siegel & Sarah Blustain, Mommy Dearest?, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2006, at 22, 25, 
available at http://www.prospect.org/UserOverride/TAPoct06.pdf. 
Indeed, to Leslee Unruh, a driving force behind the ban and the campaign manager of Vote 
YesforLife.com, the abortion-equals-murder argument is worse than useless.  “When people stop 
doing what they have been doing, which has not worked, when they listen to the women speak, 
then there will be change,” Unruh says.  “We can’t count on National Right to Life [Committee] 
to protect women.  The pro-life movement has exploited us.” 
It’s for this reason that Unruh takes obvious pride in what’s happened in South Dakota.  
“The face of this campaign [in South Dakota] has not been dead babies or babies, it’s been the 
women.  I get real angry when people want to come to South Dakota and drive around with pic-
tures of dead babies . . . it just infuriates me.” 
Unruh, a self-proclaimed feminist, is the founder of the Alpha Center, which counsels what 
they call “post-abortive” women, and president of the National Abstinence Clearinghouse. In 
2004, she says, a South Dakota legislator came to her and said they were having a hard time get-
ting a ban through, “would you come and talk to the legislators.”  She lined up 20 women to tell 
their post-abortion stories.  One woman told legislators that she had been violently raped, but 
that the abortion had been like a second rape.  Another said she had tried to kill herself as a re-
sult.  One legislator, a witness later learned, excused himself and went to another room to weep.  
According to Unruh, the legislators were in “shock.”  Within a year, the South Dakota Legisla-
ture had convened a task force, on which Unruh’s husband sat; two years later, they voted for the 
ban. Governor Mike Rounds, who had resisted a ban two years earlier was forced to sign. 
Today, many organizations agree, and are collecting the testimony of post-abortive women 
specifically for use in litigation and legislation. 
Id. 
In the week before South Dakota’s referendum, the New York Times offered a similar account of 
the referendum debate: 
[T]he most extreme arguments are nowhere to be found.  No bloody fetuses fill billboards, no ab-
solute claims are being offered about women’s rights.  Instead, in calls from a phone bank at the 
ban opponents’ headquarters, volunteers quietly tell potential voters that the law is just too nar-
row, failing to allow abortions in circumstances like rape or incest.  The supporters of the ban, 
meanwhile, speak in gentle tones about how abortion hurts women.  “I refuse to show pictures of 
dead babies,” said Leslee Unruh, who leads Vote Yes For Life, the group that is campaigning for 
the law, reflecting on methods used by anti-abortion groups.  “That’s what the old way was, and 
that’s why they were losing all these years.” 
Monica Davey, National Battle Over Abortion Focuses on South Dakota Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2006, at A5. 
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enforce these roles, as it did for centuries.  Striking down a sex-based 
alimony law in Orr v. Orr, the Court observed: 
Appellant views the Alabama alimony statutes as effectively an-
nouncing the State’s preference for an allocation of family respon-
sibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role, and as seek-
ing for their objective the reinforcement of that model among the 
State’s citizens.  We agree, as he urges, that prior cases settle that 
this purpose cannot sustain the statutes. . . . “No longer is the fe-
male destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and 
only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.” 
. . . . 
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and bur-
dens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the 
stereotypes about the “proper place” of women and their need for 
special protection.200 
Third, these constitutional constraints on the way government can 
regulate women’s roles apply equally to the regulation of pregnant 
women, whether we treat the regulation of pregnant women as facially 
neutral or sex based within the Court’s reasoning in Geduldig v. Aeillo.201  
Laws regulating pregnant women are unconstitutional if enforcing consti-
tutionally proscribed views of women was a motivating factor in the law’s 
enactment.202  If a law regulating pregnant women reflects or attempts to 
enforce stereotypes about women’s family roles, it violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, as the Court recently demonstrated in Nevada De-
partment of Human Resources v. Hibbs.203 
In Hibbs the Court held that Congress had power to enact the Fam-
ily and Medical Leave Act to remedy a pattern of state action violating 
the Equal Protection Clause.204  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion found 
that pattern of unconstitutional state action in a practice of awarding ma-
ternity leave to women and not men.205  In explaining why this tradition 
of allocating employment benefits evidenced a pattern of equal protec-
tion violations, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that differential treat-
ment of men and women in the award of maternity leave was not fairly 
attributable to differences in reproductive physiology, but instead re-
flected different sex-role expectations of male and female employees: 
Many States offered women extended “maternity” leave that ex-
ceeded the typical 4- to 8- week period of physical disability due to 
pregnancy and childbirth, but very few States granted men a paral-
 
 200. 440 U.S. 268, 279–80, 283 (1979) (citations omitted). 
 201. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).  Geduldig in fact recognizes that some forms of regulating pregnant 
women are sex based within the meaning of the Court’s equal protection cases.  See infra note 208.  
But however one analyzes that question, the equal protection cases still forbid government to pursue 
unconstitutional purposes in the ways it regulates pregnant women. 
 202. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1891–96 (developing this argument). 
 203. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 730–31. 
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lel benefit. . . . This and other differential leave policies were not at-
tributable to any differential physical needs of men and women, but 
rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family 
members is women’s work.206 
Hibbs recognized that state regulation of pregnant women can re-
flect and enforce unconstitutional sex-role assumptions about women’s 
role as mothers, observing: “Historically, denial or curtailment of 
women’s employment opportunities has been traceable directly to the 
pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and workers sec-
ond.  This prevailing ideology about women’s roles has in turn justified 
discrimination against women when they are mothers or mothers-to-
be.”207  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Hibbs shows that govern-
ment regulation of pregnant women on the basis of sex role stereotypes 
violates the Equal Protection Clause whether or not we deem it to be 
sex-based state action within the meaning of Geduldig.208 
Fourth, the equal protection cases that, on occasion, allow govern-
ment to discriminate between the sexes in ways that recognize their dif-
ferent physical roles in reproduction do not authorize the state to enforce 
gender-stereotypical family roles.  For example, in Nguyen v. INS,209 the 
Court held that rules for proving citizenship that varied for children born 
abroad of unmarried women and unmarried men were constitutional be-
cause the rules reasonably took account of differences in the physical re-
 
 206. Id. at 731; see also id. at 731 n.5. 
 207. Id. at 736.  The Court continued: 
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming 
a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.  Because employers continued to regard the family as 
the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or discouraged them from 
taking leave.  These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimina-
tion that forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered 
employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.  
Those perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to subtle discrimination that may be difficult 
to detect on a case-by-case basis. 
Id. 
 208. Geduldig states: 
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legisla-
tive classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in 
Reed . . . and Frontiero . . . . Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition 
with unique characteristics.  Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pre-
texts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, 
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legisla-
tion such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition. 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97, 496 n.20 (1974).  This passage in Geduldig has long been read 
as deciding, in the negative, the question of whether for purposes of equal protection analysis a law 
regulating pregnancy discriminates on the basis of sex.  In fact, Geduldig holds that “not . . . every leg-
islative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in 
Reed . . . and Frontiero.”  Id. 496 n.20.  It leaves open the possibility that some legislative classifications 
concerning pregnancy are sex-based classifications like those considered in Reed and Frontiero, and 
Hibbs provides examples of legislative classifications concerning pregnancy (e.g., statutes that grant 
“maternity” leave and “pregnancy disability” leave) that the Court holds are “gender-discriminatory,” 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733 n.6, and rest on “the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family mem-
bers is women’s work.”  Id. at 731; see also id. at 731 n.5. 
 209. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
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lations of reproduction: government could regulate on the assumption 
that women would be aware that they had children, but could not assume 
the same of men.210  But the Court was careful to impose limits on the 
forms of sex-specific regulation that reproductive difference authorized.  
Justice Kennedy emphasized that differential treatment of men and 
women was constitutionally permitted because it reflected a difference in 
practical situation grounded in biological difference and not stereotype: 
To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences—
such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father 
need not be—risks making the guarantee of equal protection super-
ficial, and so disserving it.  Mechanistic classification of all our dif-
ferences as stereotypes would operate to obscure those misconcep-
tions and prejudices that are real.  The distinction embodied in the 
statutory scheme here at issue is not marked by misconception and 
prejudice, nor does it show disrespect for either class.  The differ-
ence between men and women in relation to the birth process is a 
real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Con-
gress to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each 
gender.211 
Following Nguyen, laws that claim their justification in reproductive 
difference cannot be based on “stereotypes” that reflect “misconception 
and prejudice,” or “show disrespect” for men or women.  In United States 
v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg expressed this understanding: “‘Inherent 
differences’ between men and women, we have come to appreciate, re-
main cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of ei-
ther sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportu-
nity. . . . [S]uch classifications may not be used, as they once were, to 
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of 
women.”212 
Under the equal protection cases, then, government may recognize 
that men and women have different physical roles in reproduction, but it 
may not use those differences to justify laws that enforce different social 
roles in reproduction—especially the gender-differentiated care-
giver/breadwinner roles of the separate spheres tradition.  Pointing to 
physical differences in reproduction to justify laws that impose these gen-
 
 210. In Nguyen the Court held that government had an interest in 
ensuring some opportunity for a tie between citizen father and foreign born child which is a rea-
sonable substitute for the opportunity manifest between mother and child at the time of 
birth. . . . Even if a father knows of the fact of conception, moreover, it does not follow that he 
will be present at the birth of the child.  Thus, unlike the case of the mother, there is no assurance 
that the father and his biological child will ever meet.  Without an initial point of contact with the 
child by a father who knows the child is his own, there is no opportunity for father and child to 
begin a relationship.  Section 1409 takes the unremarkable step of ensuring that such an opportu-
nity, inherent in the event of birth as to the mother-child relationship, exists between father and 
child before citizenship is conferred upon the latter. 
Id. at 66–67. 
 211. Id. at 73. 
 212. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (citations omitted). 
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der-differentiated social roles is the kind of caste-based reasoning the 
Court embraced in cases like Bradwell and Muller;213 it enforces the very 
stereotypes about sex-based family roles that the Court’s equal protec-
tion cases condemn.  As cases like Bradwell and Muller remind us, equal 
protection cases prohibit government from using law to enforce sex-
stereotypical family roles, not just because this use of law inhibits indi-
vidual opportunity but also because this use of law imposes group ine-
quality; laws enforcing gender-differentiated family roles have long 
played a role in limiting women’s civic participation.  To summarize, 
then, under the Court’s equal protection cases, the state may regulate in 
ways that recognize that men and women have different physical roles in 
reproduction, but may not invoke these physical differences to organize 
family or market relations in ways that perpetuate the gender-
stereotypical social roles of the separate spheres tradition.214  Citizens 
may choose to live gender-stereotypical lives, but government compro-
mises the liberty and equality of its citizens if it uses law to impose gen-
der-stereotypical roles on them. 
It is precisely this constraint on government that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist recognizes in Hibbs when he describes constitutional viola-
tions involving lengthy “‘maternity’ leave” and “other differential leave 
policies [that] were not attributable to any differential physical needs of 
men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that car-
ing for family members is women’s work.215  Rehnquist did not see a con-
stitutional violation in the award of childbearing leave to women only, 
but instead in the award of childcare leave to women only.  Government 
may have believed that women, and not men, would or should stay home 
 
 213. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(“The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and 
mother.  This is the law of the Creator.”); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).  In Muller, 
the Court upheld protective labor regulation that limited the hours and places women could work, 
reasoning: 
Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by her-
self, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not 
necessary for men, and could not be sustained. . . . [H]er physical structure and a proper discharge 
of her maternal functions—having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the 
race—justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. The limita-
tions which this statute places upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree with her em-
ployer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the 
benefit of all.  Many words cannot make this plainer.  The two sexes differ in structure of body, in 
the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long 
continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the fu-
ture well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the ca-
pacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence.  This difference justifies a difference in legislation 
and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her. 
Id. at 422–23. 
 214. Siegel, supra note 20, at 1888 (“Practices of sex differentiation [once justified as reflecting the 
different] physical roles of the sexes in reproduction . . . are now understood unconstitutionally to en-
force different social roles in reproduction, ‘part of the “baggage of sexual stereotypes” that presumes 
the father has the primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials, while the mother is the 
center of home and family life.’” (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979))). 
 215. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 & n. 5 (2003); see also id. at 731 n.5. 
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from work to provide childcare to infants, but, Rehnquist held, it violated 
the Equal Protection Clause for government to perpetuate that sex-role 
expectation by law.  The Hibbs holding is an ordinary application of the 
principle that the state may have a “preference for an allocation of family 
responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role,” but laws 
that “seek[] for their objective the reinforcement of that model among 
the State’s citizens” are unconstitutional;216 government may not use law 
for “reinforcing stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their 
need for special protection.”217 
Thus, equal protection cases that recognize that men and women 
have different physical roles in reproduction do not authorize the South 
Dakota statute.  These precedents do not even remotely sanction a law 
whose purpose is to regulate a female citizen to ensure that she acts like 
a “normal” woman and makes choices about continuing a pregnancy that 
reflect her “inherent” or “intrinsic” “nature as a mother.” 
When South Dakota asserted an interest in prohibiting abortion to 
protect an embryo or fetus that is physically within a pregnant woman, it 
stated a regulatory aim that might justify singling out a pregnant woman 
under the line of cases we have just been examining.  Even then, fetal-
protective regulation of a pregnant woman’s conduct would still be sub-
ject to equal protection review, to ensure that gender bias did not shape 
the way government pursued a constitutionally benign interest in pro-
tecting potential life.218 
But South Dakota not only regulated the pregnant woman’s con-
duct to protect the unborn life she carries; it regulated her conduct to 
protect the pregnant woman, by overseeing her decision about whether 
to assume, avoid, or defer the role of motherhood.  South Dakota 
wanted to prevent women’s efforts to avoid or defer motherhood, pro-
hibiting abortion “to fully protect . . . the mother’s fundamental natural 
intrinsic right to a relationship with her child.”219  In findings supporting 
the ban and the state’s informed consent law, the state gave a fairly de-
tailed account of the understanding of women’s agency and women’s 
roles on which its regulation was premised.  The state sought to intervene 
in women’s decision making for the stated reason that a pregnant woman 
does not have the independence of judgment to make decisions about 
motherhood in her own best interest.220  The state sought to intervene in 
women’s decision making in the stated belief that she would “suffer[] 
significant psychological trauma and distress” for acting contrary to “the 
normal, natural, and healthy capability of a woman whose natural in-
 
 216. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279–80 (1979) (citation omitted). 
 217. Id. at 283 (citation omitted). 
 218. See Siegel, supra note 29; Siegel, supra note 20; see also infra text accompanying note 231. 
 219. H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006). 
 220. See supra Part III.A. 
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stincts are to protect and nurture her child.”221  South Dakota prohibited 
abortion to enforce sex-role morality on resisting women.222 
In 2007, prohibiting abortion for this purpose violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.  South Dakota cannot use the criminal law to ensure 
that its female citizens choose and act like women should.  The standard 
to which the state would have held women is unabashedly and unremit-
tingly sex based.223  The state judged the choices of its female citizens 
against an idealized model of a “normal” woman—not against an ideal-
ized model of a citizen or even a man—a model in which a woman’s in-
terests are fully realized in caring for her young because the pregnant 
woman naturally “transfer[s] her interest from herself to her child”224 as 
she becomes a mother whom the state exalts as having an “unselfish na-
ture.”225  In the Task Force Report’s view, these qualities are distinctive to 
women.  The Report concludes with the observation that “the intrinsic 
beauty of womanhood is inseparable from the beauty of motherhood; 
and that this relationship, in its unselfish nature, and, in its role in the 
survival of the human race, is the touchstone and core of all civilized so-
ciety.”226  The state surely may celebrate qualities of selflessness in its 
citizens—but under the Constitution it may not single out some on whom 
to impose selflessness by law.  When government enforces gender-
stereotypical family roles, it reasons about the sexes and restricts their 
freedom in ways that perpetuate the separate spheres tradition—
understandings and arrangements that citizens may choose but govern-
ment may not enforce. 
Today, government may no longer exclude women from the prac-
tice of law on the grounds that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of 
woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.  
This is the law of the Creator.”227  Individual women can embrace moth-
erhood as their central life pursuit or to integrate motherhood with other 
identities and activities—women vary dramatically in the emotional and 
practical strategies they employ—but government cannot impose its view 
of women’s nature.  Under the equal protection cases, government can-
not require a woman seeking an abortion to become a mother for the 
reason that the state knows a pregnant woman’s desires and needs better 
than the pregnant woman herself.  This kind of gender-based paternalism 
 
 221. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 47–48. 
 222. David Reardon expresses the point succinctly: 
Therefore, when we are talking about the psychological complications of abortion, we are implic-
itly talking about the physical and behavioral symptoms of a moral problem.  By focusing public 
attention on the symptoms of post-abortion trauma, we will inevitably draw the middle majority 
back to understanding the causes of the problem: the injustice of killing unborn children and the 
guilt of weakness and betrayal which haunts the mother’s heart. 
REARDON, supra note 115, at 10. 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 187–89. 
 224. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 54. 
 225. Id. at 67. 
 226. Id. at 67; see also supra note 192 (quoting the Task Force Report). 
 227. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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is forbidden by the Constitution, whether or not the government ex-
plains, as South Dakota has, “that the intrinsic beauty of womanhood is 
inseparable from the beauty of motherhood.”228  Citizens may seek coun-
seling for abortion-related questions on this or any other premise, but it 
is not a view of women that government may use law to enforce.  The 
Constitution forbids paternalism of this kind because of the mistaken and 
harmful judgments about women it engenders.  Lawmakers reasoning 
from traditional forms of gender paternalism may not recognize that 
women who have abortions are competent decision makers grappling 
with complex practical and relational considerations.  The gender stereo-
types on which such paternalism is based make it “reasonable” to “help” 
women by coercing them into continuing pregnancies where an encoun-
ter with the actual reasons women have abortions might make reason-
able other interventions that would enable women to continue pregnan-
cies with less adverse consequence to them and their families.  Gender-
paternalism triggers equal protection concern where other forms of pa-
ternalism do not, because of the denigrating assumptions about women it 
reflects and the dangerous uses of law it may enable. 
The Constitution prohibits the state from imposing sex-stereotyped 
roles on women even to protect them, not simply because of the attitudes 
about women such laws engender, but also because of the restrictions on 
women that such laws enforce.  South Dakota expressed its sentiments 
about women in an abortion law, not a greeting card.  Unlike greeting 
cards, abortion laws can deprive women of employment, education, and 
food for their children.  Abortion laws can bind women to relations in 
which they have been or will be abused.  Depriving women of choice in 
matters of motherhood, or control of timing in matters of motherhood, 
profoundly defines the course of women’s lives—something in which 
women take a not unnatural interest.  The more a woman needs or wants 
to mother on her own, or to combine mothering with any life pursuit not 
traditionally occupied by mothers, the more such control matters. 
The gender-based argument for abortion restrictions invites the 
public to ignore all of these concerns.  The gender-based argument for 
abortion restrictions minimizes the public’s compunction about coercing 
women by presenting it as a benign form of protecting women.  Because 
the gender-based argument for abortion restrictions actuates deep 
stereotypes about women, it predisposes the public to discount the digni-
tary and material impact of forced motherhood on women.229 
 
 228. See the concluding statement of the Task Force Report quoted supra note 192 and supra text 
accompanying note 226. 
 229. Under the sway of these ancient stereotypes, abortion restrictions seem to some as reason-
able ways of helping women.  But criminalizing abortion is not responsive to the reasons women seek 
abortion, and there is little reason to believe it would provide relief, even to the suffering few.  Crimi-
nalizing abortion would not, for instance, address the needs of women who seek an abortion because 
they lacked contraception or were raped or are living in abusive relationships, or will have to drop out 
of work or school to raise a child alone, or are stretched so thin that they cannot emotionally or finan-
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When government regulates on the basis of stereotypes about 
women, it entrenches traditional arrangements that constrain women in-
dividually and as a class.  In the passing moment that the Task Force Re-
port considers how women are to survive if forced by the state to become 
mothers, the Report recommends that the South Dakota Legislature 
“[s]trengthen the child support laws, including the requirement that the 
father of an unborn child support the mother and their unborn child dur-
ing the pregnancy and thereafter.”230  At no point does the Report discuss 
enforcing or strengthening laws that prevent employers from discriminat-
ing against pregnant women and employees with childcare responsibili-
ties. 
The South Dakota legislative process illuminates reasons why abor-
tion restrictions raise equal protection concerns, even if woman-
protective antiabortion argument is invoked in support of an informed 
consent law instead of a ban231—and even if a ban is justified on fetal-
protective rather than woman-protective grounds.  Given the forms of 
reasoning about controlling women that are now openly circulating as 
justifications for abortion restrictions, it is plain that abortion regulation 
is the site of sex-role struggle, much as the regulation of the vote or 
women’s ability to practice law once was—indeed, much as the regula-
tion of birth control was when states enacted the first laws banning abor-
tion and contraception in the nineteenth century.232 
The history of South Dakota’s abortion ban illuminates a funda-
mental question at the heart of the abortion debate, a question at the 
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and substantive 
due process jurisprudence, a question that lives at the intersection of lib-
erty and equality concerns: whether government respects women’s pre-
rogative and capacity to make choices about motherhood. 
IV. NOTES TOWARD A CONCLUSION: FROM REPRODUCTIVE LIBERTY 
IN THE SEX EQUALITY CASES TO SEX EQUALITY IN THE 
REPRODUCTIVE LIBERTY CASES 
Roe was decided several years before the Court adopted its equal 
protection framework for analyzing questions of sex discrimination.  Roe 
gave constitutional protection to the abortion choice, without fully ap-
 
cially provide for their other children.  Likewise, an informed consent law that threatens doctors if 
they do not tell women unproven “facts” about abortion or that would sanction doctors who fail to 
give a moral lecture to patients about terminating “the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human 
being” with whom “the pregnant woman has an existing relationship” may well intimidate women into 
continuing pregnancies—without ever addressing the reasons a pregnant woman has attempted to 
avoid or defer motherhood.  Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2007). 
 230. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 75, at 70. 
 231. For a pathbreaking analysis of the First Amendment implications of an informed consent 
statute such as South Dakota’s, see Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment 
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939. 
 232. See supra Part II.A. 
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preciating that it was protecting values of equal citizenship as well as per-
sonal liberty.  Indeed, Roe analyzed the state’s interest in restricting 
abortion as if such regulation expressed a contested application of the 
harm principle—without considering the possibility that such regulation 
also might reflect contested views of women.  Roe recognized the state’s 
interest in regulating abortion to protect maternal health and potential 
life without subjecting expressions of those regulatory interests to scru-
tiny for gender bias as the Court’s equal protection cases might; yet Roe 
sharply constrained government from acting on these regulatory inter-
ests, through the trimester framework that barred most regulation of the 
abortion decision.233 
Two decades later, when the Court replaced Roe’s trimester frame-
work with undue burden analysis in Casey, concern about the risk of 
gender bias in abortion regulation became a much more explicit part of 
the substantive due process inquiry.234  In its statement of the abortion 
right, Casey observed: 
Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, 
without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however 
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our 
culture.  The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent 
on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in 
society.235 
The Court’s insistence that abortion regulation not enforce the gender-
stereotypical understandings of the separate spheres tradition also 
shaped its application of undue burden analysis, specifically its rejection 
of a spousal notice requirement on the grounds that the abortion law re-
flected “a view of marriage consonant with the common-law status of 
married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage 
and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution.”236 
This understanding of the equality values supporting the abortion 
right is likely to develop as understanding of the sex discrimination faced 
 
 233. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  For opinions rewriting Roe as a sex equality opinion, 
see WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE 
AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (including opinions by Jack 
Balkin, Reva Siegel, and Robin West).  My opinion in this volume examines the development of equal 
protection law in matters concerning pregnancy discrimination at the time of the Roe decision.  See id. 
at 63. 
 234. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  For sources discussing liberty 
and equality values in Roe and Casey, see Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in 
Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF 
MOTHERHOOD (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (surveying equality argu-
ments for the abortion right in law review literature and in Casey); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Ar-
guments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 
EMORY L.J. 815 (2007); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Constitutional Equality as a Cultural Form: The 
Courts and the Meanings of Sex and Gender, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513, 531–35 (2003); Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women’s Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137, 
147–50. 
 235. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
 236. Id. at 898. 
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by pregnant women continues to accumulate.  With each passing year, 
federal courts learn more about the dynamics of sex discrimination 
against “mothers or mothers-to-be”237 as they enforce the 1978 Preg-
nancy Discrimination Amendment238 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964239 
and the Family and Medical Leave Act.240  Hibbs reflects this growing 
understanding, and, in its wake, courts are now beginning more closely to 
examine sex discrimination against pregnant women under the Constitu-
tion’s Equal Protection Clause.241  As a body of law constraining gov-
ernment regulation of pregnant women under the Equal Protection 
Clause develops, courts will begin, as they already have, to explore the 
connections between Hibbs and Casey. 
In coming years, equal protection values are likely to continue seep-
ing into the elaboration of substantive due process doctrine.  Just as Ca-
sey reviewed Pennsylvania’s spousal notice law with concern that it might 
perpetuate traditional views of marital roles now understood to violate 
equal protection, so too a court might scrutinize abortion laws to ensure 
that government does not reason from stereotypes about women’s 
agency or women’s roles when it vindicates legitimate interests in regu-
lating the procedure.242  Pronounced forms of underinclusivity or overin-
clusivity in the means by which the state has pursued its interest in pro-
tecting maternal health or potential life might reveal that abortion 
regulation is in fact driven by unconstitutional stereotypes about 
women—“increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of 
females in the home rather than in the marketplace and world of 
ideas.”243 
 
 237. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 238. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). 
 239. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–2000h-6 (2000). 
 240. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000). 
 241. For an essay suggesting how this body of law developed over the decades through an exami-
nation of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s evolving views, see Siegel, supra note 20. 
 242. This understanding of Casey already finds expression in the case law.  In Tucson Woman’s 
Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004), a case involving an equal protection challenge to laws re-
stricting access to abortion clinics, the Ninth Circuit held that constitutional values vindicated by equal 
protection intermediate scrutiny were an integral part of undue burden analysis.  In the Ninth Circuit’s 
view, the equal protection restrictions that Hibbs imposed on the regulation of pregnancy were also 
enforced by undue burden analysis in Casey, as it limited an abortion-restrictive regulation that re-
flects paternalism or sex stereotyping: 
In fact, elements of intermediate scrutiny review particular to sex-based classifications, such 
as the rules against paternalism and sex-stereotyping, are evident in the Casey opinion, and 
should be considered by courts assessing the legitimacy of abortion regulation under the undue 
burden standard.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (approving only of information provided to a woman 
seeking an abortion that is “truthful and not misleading”); id. at 898 (“A State may not give to a 
man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children.  Section 3209 
embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-law status of married women but re-
pugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the 
Constitution.”). 
Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 549 (internal citations omitted). 
 243. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (citation omitted). 
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And should the Court one day restrict Casey, or reverse Roe, as the 
South Dakota Legislature hoped,244 constitutional principles of equal 
protection elaborated in cases spanning the decades from Frontiero to 
Virginia to Hibbs will remain as a constraint on the kinds of abortion 
regulation the Constitution allows in the twenty-first century—an under-
standing of the Equal Protection Clause that abortion laws like South 
Dakota’s will have helped engender. 
 
 244. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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